# Statistics and Machine Learning using belief functions 

## Lecture 1 - Representation and Combination of Evidence

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## Topic of this seminar

( This course is about the theory of belief functions and its applications to Statistics and Machine Learning.
(2) What is the Theory of Belief Functions?

- A formal framework for reasoning and making decisions under uncertainty.
- Originates from Arthur Dempster's seminal work on statistical inference with lower and upper probabilities.
- It was then further developed by Glenn Shafer who showed that belief functions can be used as a general framework for representing and reasoning with uncertain information.
- Also known as Evidence theory or Dempster-Shafer theory.
(3) Many applications in several fields such as artificial intelligence, information fusion, pattern recognition, etc.
(9) Recently, there has been a revived interested in its application to Statistical Inference and Machine Learning (classification, clustering).


## Outline of the seminar

(1) Representation and combination of evidence

Constructing Belief Functions from Sample Data Using Multinomial Confidence Regions. International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 42(3):228-252, 2006.
(2) Decision-making and classification

Analysis of evidence-theoretic decision rules for pattern classification. Pattern Recognition 30(7):1095-1107, 1997.
(3) Clustering

Evidential clustering of large dissimilarity data. Knowledge-Based Systems 106:179-195, 2016.
(9) Learning from uncertain data

Maximum likelihood estimation from Uncertain Data in the Belief Function Framework. IEEE Trans. on Knowledge and Data Eng. 25(1):119-130, 2013.
(6) Estimation and prediction

Prediction of future observations using belief functions: a likelihood-based approach. International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 72:71-94, 2016.

## Outline

## (1) Representation of evidence

- Mass functions
- Belief and plausibility functions

2 Relations with alternative theories

- Possibility theory
- Imprecise probabilities
(3) Combination of evidence
- Dempster's rule
- Disjunctive rule
- Dubois-Prade rule

4. Predictive belief functions

- Formalization
- Method
- Ordered data


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## Mass function

Definition

- Let $X$ be a variable taking values in a finite set $\Omega$ (frame of discernment)
- Evidence about $X$ may be represented by a mass function $m: 2^{\Omega} \rightarrow[0,1]$ such that

$$
\sum_{A \subseteq \Omega} m(A)=1
$$

- Every $A$ of $\Omega$ such that $m(A)>0$ is a focal set of $m$
- $m$ is said to be normalized if $m(\emptyset)=0$. This property will be assumed hereafter, unless otherwise specified


## Example: the broken sensor

- Let $X$ be some physical quantity (e.g., a temperature), talking values in $\Omega$.
- A sensor returns a set of values $A \subset \Omega$, for instance, $A=[20,22]$.
- However, the sensor may be broken, in which case the value it returns is completely arbitrary.
- There is a probability $p=0.1$ that the sensor is broken.
- What can we say about $X$ ? How to represent the available information (evidence)?


## Analysis



- Here, the probability $p$ is not about $X$, but about the state of a sensor.
- Let $S=\{$ working, broken $\}$ the set of possible sensor states.
- If the state is "working", we know that $X \in A$.
- If the state is "broken", we just know that $X \in \Omega$, and nothing more.
- This uncertain evidence can be represented by a mass function $m$ on $\Omega$, such that

$$
m(A)=0.9, \quad m(\Omega)=0.1
$$

## Source

- A mass function $m$ on $\Omega$ may be viewed as arising from
- A set $S=\left\{s_{1}, \ldots, s_{r}\right\}$ of states (interpretations)
- A probability measure $P$ on $S$
- A multi-valued mapping $\Gamma: S \rightarrow 2^{\Omega}$
- The four-tuple $\left(S, 2^{S}, P, \Gamma\right)$ is called a source for $m$
- Meaning: under interpretation $s_{i}$, the evidence tells us that $X \in \Gamma\left(s_{i}\right)$, and nothing more. The probability $P\left(\left\{s_{i}\right\}\right)$ is transferred to $A_{i}=\Gamma\left(s_{i}\right)$
- $m(A)$ is the probability of knowing that $X \in A$, and nothing more, given the available evidence


## Special cases

- If the evidence tells us that $X \in A$ for sure and nothing more, for some $A \subseteq \Omega$, then we have a logical mass function $m_{A}$ such that $m_{A}(A)=1$
- $m_{A}$ is equivalent to $A$
- Special case: $m_{\text {? }}$, the vacuous mass function, represents total ignorance
- If each interpretation $s_{i}$ of the evidence points to a single value of $X$, then all focal sets are singletons and $m$ is said to be Bayesian. It is equivalent to a probability distribution
- A Dempster-Shafer mass function can thus be seen as
- a generalized set
- a generalized probability distribution
- Total ignorance is represented by the vacuous mass function $m_{\text {? }}$ such that $m_{?}(\Omega)=1$


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## Degrees of support and consistency

- Let $m$ be a normalized mass function on $\Omega$ induced by a source $\left(S, 2^{S}, P, \Gamma\right)$.
- Let $A$ be a subset of $\Omega$.
- One may ask:
(1) To what extent does the evidence support the proposition $\omega \in A$ ?
(2) To what extent is the evidence consistent with this proposition?



## Belief function

Definition and interpretation

- For any $A \subseteq \Omega$, the probability that the evidence implies (supports) the proposition $X \in A$ is

$$
\operatorname{Be}\left((A)=P(\{s \in S \mid \Gamma(s) \subseteq A\})=\sum_{B \subseteq A} m(B) .\right.
$$



- The function $\mathrm{Bel}: A \rightarrow \operatorname{Bel}(A)$ is called a belief function.


## Plausibility function

- The probability that the evidence is consistent with (does not contradict) the proposition $X \in A$

$$
P l(A)=P(\{s \in S \mid \Gamma(s) \cap A \neq \emptyset\})=1-\operatorname{Bel}(\bar{A})
$$



- The function $P I: A \rightarrow P I(A)$ is called a plausibility function.
- The function $p l: \omega \rightarrow P l(\{\omega\})$ is called a contour function.


## Two-dimensional representation

- The uncertainty about a proposition $A$ is represented by two numbers: $\operatorname{Bel}(A)$ and $P l(A)$, with $\operatorname{Bel}(A) \leq P I(A)$
- The intervals $[\operatorname{Bel}(A), P l(A)]$ have maximum length when $m=m_{?}$ is vacuous: then, $\operatorname{Bel}(A)=0$ for all $A \neq \Omega$, and $P l(A)=1$ for all $A \neq \emptyset$.
- The intervals $[\operatorname{Bel}(A), P I(A)]$ have minimum length when $m$ is Bayesian. Then, $\operatorname{Bel}(A)=P l(A)$ for all $A$, and $B e l$ is a probability measure.


## Broken sensor example

- From

$$
m(A)=0.9, \quad m(\Omega)=0.1
$$

we get

$$
\begin{gathered}
\operatorname{Bel}(A)=m(A)=0.9, \quad P l(A)=m(A)+m(\Omega)=1 \\
\operatorname{Bel}(\bar{A})=0, \quad P l(\bar{A})=m(\Omega)=0.1 \\
\operatorname{Bel}(\Omega)=P I(\Omega)=1
\end{gathered}
$$

- We observe that

$$
\begin{gathered}
\operatorname{Bel}(A \cup \bar{A}) \geq \operatorname{Bel}(A)+\operatorname{Bel}(\bar{A}) \\
P l(A \cup \bar{A}) \leq P I(A)+P l(\bar{A})
\end{gathered}
$$

- Bel and $P l$ are non additive measures.


## Characterization of belief functions

- Function $\mathrm{Bel}: 2^{\Omega} \rightarrow[0,1]$ is a completely monotone capacity: it verifies $\operatorname{Be}(\emptyset)=0, \operatorname{Be}(\Omega)=1$ and

$$
\operatorname{Bel}\left(\bigcup_{i=1}^{k} A_{i}\right) \geq \sum_{\emptyset \neq I \subseteq\{1, \ldots, k\}}(-1)^{|I|+1} B e l\left(\bigcap_{i \in I} A_{i}\right) .
$$

for any $k \geq 2$ and for any family $A_{1}, \ldots, A_{k}$ in $2^{\Omega}$.

- Conversely, to any completely monotone capacity Bel corresponds a unique mass function $m$ such that:

$$
m(A)=\sum_{\emptyset \neq B \subseteq A}(-1)^{|A|-|B|} B e l(B), \quad \forall A \subseteq \Omega .
$$

## Relations between $m, B e l$ et $P /$

- Let $m$ be a mass function, Bel and $P /$ the corresponding belief and plausibility functions
- For all $A \subseteq \Omega$,

$$
\begin{gathered}
B e l(A)=1-P l(\bar{A}) \\
m(A)=\sum_{\emptyset \neq B \subseteq A}(-1)^{|A|-|B|} \operatorname{Bel}(B) \\
m(A)=\sum_{B \subseteq A}(-1)^{|A|-|B|+1} P l(\bar{B})
\end{gathered}
$$

- $m, B e l$ et $P l$ are thus three equivalent representations of
- a piece of evidence or, equivalently
- a state of belief induced by this evidence


## Least Commitment Principle

- It is sometimes interesting to compare two mass functions with respect to their information content.
- Let $m_{1}$ and $m_{2}$ be two mass functions on $\Omega$. We say that $m_{1}$ is less committed than $m_{2}$ (noted $m_{1} \sqsupseteq m_{2}$ ) if

$$
B e l_{1}(A) \leq B e l_{2}(A), \quad \forall A \subseteq \Omega
$$

or, equivalently,

$$
P l_{1}(A) \geq P l_{2}(A), \quad \forall A \subseteq \Omega
$$

- Interpretation: $m_{1}$ and $m_{2}$ are consistent, but $m_{1}$ contains less information than $m_{2}$.
- Least Commitment Principle: when several belief functions are compatible with a set of constraints, the least informative according to some informational ordering (if it exists) should be selected.


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## Consonant belief function

- When the focal sets of $m$ are nested: $A_{1} \subset A_{2} \subset \ldots \subset A_{r}, m$ is said to be consonant
- The following relations then hold, for all $A, B \subseteq \Omega$,

$$
\begin{gathered}
P l(A \cup B)=\max (P l(A), P l(B)) \\
B e l(A \cap B)=\min (\operatorname{Bel}(A), B e l(B))
\end{gathered}
$$

- $P /$ is this a possibility measure, and $B e l$ is the dual necessity measure


## Contour function

- The contour function of a belief function Bel is defined by

$$
p l(\omega)=P l(\{\omega\}), \quad \forall \omega \in \Omega
$$

- When Bel is consonant, it can be recovered from its contour function,

$$
P I(A)=\max _{\omega \in A} p l(\omega) .
$$

- The contour function is then a possibility distribution
- The theory of belief function can thus be considered as more expressive than possibility theory


## From the contour function to the mass function

- Let $p /$ be a contour on the frame $\Omega=\left\{\omega_{1}, \ldots, \omega_{n}\right\}$, with elements arranged by decreasing order of plausibility, i.e.,

$$
1=p \prime\left(\omega_{1}\right) \geq p \prime\left(\omega_{2}\right) \geq \ldots \geq p \prime\left(\omega_{n}\right)
$$

and let $A_{i}$ denote the set $\left\{\omega_{1}, \ldots, \omega_{i}\right\}$, for $1 \leq i \leq n$.

- Then, the corresponding mass function $m$ is

$$
\begin{aligned}
m\left(A_{i}\right) & =p l\left(\omega_{i}\right)-p l\left(\omega_{i+1}\right), \quad 1 \leq i \leq n-1, \\
m(\Omega) & =p l\left(\omega_{n}\right) .
\end{aligned}
$$

## Example

- Consider, for instance, the following contour distribution defined on the frame $\Omega=\{a, b, c, d\}$ :

| $\omega$ | $a$ | $b$ | $c$ | $d$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $p /(\omega)$ | 0.3 | 0.5 | 1 | 0.7 |

- The corresponding mass function is

$$
\begin{aligned}
m(\{c\}) & =1-0.7=0.3 \\
m(\{c, d\}) & =0.7-0.5=0.2 \\
m(\{c, d, b\}) & =0.5-0.3=0.2 \\
m(\{c, d, b, a\}) & =0.3
\end{aligned}
$$

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## Credal set

- A probability measure $P$ on $\Omega$ is said to be compatible with $B e /$ if

$$
\operatorname{Bel}(A) \leq P(A)
$$

for all $A \subseteq \Omega$

- Equivalently, $P(A) \leq P I(A)$ for all $A \subseteq \Omega$
- The set $\mathcal{P}(m)$ of probability measures compatible with $m$ is called the credal set of $m$

$$
\mathcal{P}(B e l)=\{P: \forall A \subseteq \Omega, \operatorname{Be} l(A) \leq P(A))\}
$$

## Construction of $\mathcal{P}(\mathrm{Be} /)$

- An arbitrary element of $\mathcal{P}(\mathrm{Bel})$ can be obtained by distributing each mass $m(A)$ among the elements of $A$.
- More precisely, let $\alpha(\omega, \boldsymbol{A})$ be the fraction of $m(\boldsymbol{A})$ allocated to the element $\omega$. We have

$$
\sum_{\omega \in A} \alpha(\omega, \boldsymbol{A})=m(\boldsymbol{A})
$$

- By summing up the numbers $\alpha(\omega, \boldsymbol{A})$ for each $\omega$, we get a probability mass function on $\Omega$,

$$
p_{\alpha}(\omega)=\sum_{A \ni \omega} \alpha(\omega, A) .
$$

- It can be verified that

$$
P_{\alpha}(A)=\sum_{\omega \in A} p_{\alpha}(\omega) \geq \operatorname{Bel}(A)
$$

for all $A \subseteq \Omega$.

## Belief functions are coherent lower probabilities

- It can be shown (Dempster, 1967) that any element of the credal set $\mathcal{P}(\mathrm{Be})$ can be obtained in that way.
- Furthermore, the bounds in the inequalities $\operatorname{Bel}(A) \leq P(A)$ and $P(A) \leq P I(A)$ are attained. We thus have, for all $A \subseteq \Omega$,

$$
\begin{aligned}
B e l(A) & =\min _{P \in \mathcal{P}(B e l)} P(A) \\
P l(A) & =\max _{P \in \mathcal{P}(B e l)} P(A)
\end{aligned}
$$

- We say that $B e l$ is a coherent lower probability.
- Not all lower envelopes of sets of probability measures are belief functions!


## A counterexample

- Suppose a fair coin is tossed twice, in such a way that the outcome of the second toss may depend on the outcome of the first toss.
- The outcome of the experiment can be denoted by $\Omega=\{(H, H),(H, T),(T, H),(T, T)\}$.
- Let $H_{1}=\{(H, H),(H, T)\}$ and $H_{2}=\{(H, H),(T, H)\}$ the events that we get Heads in the first and second toss, respectively.
- Let $\mathcal{P}$ be the set of probability measures on $\Omega$ which assign $P\left(H_{1}\right)=P\left(H_{2}\right)=1 / 2$ and have an arbitrary degree of dependence between tosses.
- Let $P_{*}$ be the lower envelope of $\mathcal{P}$.


## A counterexample - continued

- It is clear that $P_{*}\left(H_{1}\right)=1 / 2, P_{*}\left(H_{2}\right)=1 / 2$ and $P_{*}\left(H_{1} \cap H_{2}\right)=0$ (as the occurrence Heads in the first toss may never lead to getting Heads in the second toss).
- Now, in the case of complete positive dependence, $P\left(H_{1} \cup H_{2}\right)=P\left(H_{1}\right)=1 / 2$, hence $P_{*}\left(H_{1} \cup H_{2}\right) \leq 1 / 2$.
- We thus have

$$
P_{*}\left(H_{1} \cup H_{2}\right)<P_{*}\left(H_{1}\right)+P_{*}\left(H_{2}\right)-P_{*}\left(H_{1} \cap H_{2}\right),
$$

which violates the complete monotonicity condition for $k=2$.

## Two different theories

- Mathematically, the notion of coherent lower probability is thus more general than that of belief function.
- However, the definition of the credal set associated with a belief function is purely formal, as these probabilities have no particular interpretation in our framework.
- The theory of belief functions is not a theory of imprecise probabilities.


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## Broken sensor example continued

- The first item of evidence gave us: $m_{1}(A)=0.9, m_{1}(\Omega)=0.1$.
- Another sensor returns another set of values $B$, and it is in working condition with probability 0.8 .
- This second piece if evidence can be represented by the mass function: $m_{2}(B)=0.8, m_{2}(\Omega)=0.2$
- How to combine these two pieces of evidence?


## Analysis



- If interpretations $s_{1} \in S_{1}$ and $s_{2} \in S_{2}$ both hold, then $X \in \Gamma_{1}\left(s_{1}\right) \cap \Gamma_{2}\left(s_{2}\right)$
- If the two pieces of evidence are independent, then the probability that $s_{1}$ and $s_{2}$ both hold is $P_{1}\left(\left\{s_{1}\right\}\right) P_{2}\left(\left\{s_{2}\right\}\right)$


## Computation

|  | $S_{2}$ working <br> $(0.8)$ | $S_{2}$ broken <br> $(0.2)$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $S_{1}$ working (0.9) | $A \cap B, 0.72$ | $A, 0.18$ |
| $S_{1}$ broken $(0.1)$ | $B, 0.08$ | $\Omega, 0.02$ |

We then get the following combined mass function,

$$
\begin{aligned}
m(A \cap B) & =0.72 \\
m(A) & =0.18 \\
m(B) & =0.08 \\
m(\Omega) & =0.02
\end{aligned}
$$

## Case of conflicting pieces of evidence



- If $\Gamma_{1}\left(s_{1}\right) \cap \Gamma_{2}\left(s_{2}\right)=\emptyset$, we know that $s_{1}$ and $s_{2}$ cannot hold simultaneously
- The joint probability distribution on $S_{1} \times S_{2}$ must be conditioned to eliminate such pairs


## Computation

|  | $S_{2}$ working <br> $(0.8)$ | $S_{2}$ broken <br> $(0.2)$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $S_{1}$ working (0.9) | $\emptyset, 0.72$ | $A, 0.18$ |
| $S_{1}$ broken $(0.1)$ | $B, 0.08$ | $\Omega, 0.02$ |

We then get the following combined mass function,

$$
\begin{aligned}
m(\emptyset) & =0 \\
m(A) & =0.18 / 0.28 \approx 0.64 \\
m(B) & =0.08 / 0.28 \approx 0.29 \\
m(\Omega) & =0.02 / 0.28 \approx 0.07
\end{aligned}
$$

## Dempster's rule

- Let $m_{1}$ and $m_{2}$ be two mass functions and

$$
\kappa=\sum_{B \cap C=\emptyset} m_{1}(B) m_{2}(C)
$$

their degree of conflict

- If $\kappa<1$, then $m_{1}$ and $m_{2}$ can be combined as

$$
\left(m_{1} \oplus m_{2}\right)(A)=\frac{1}{1-\kappa} \sum_{B \cap C=A} m_{1}(B) m_{2}(C), \quad \forall A \neq \emptyset
$$

and $\left(m_{1} \oplus m_{2}\right)(\emptyset)=0$

## Another example

| $A$ | $\emptyset$ | $\{a\}$ | $\{b\}$ | $\{a, b\}$ | $\{c\}$ | $\{a, c\}$ | $\{b, c\}$ | $\{a, b, c\}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $m_{1}(A)$ | 0 | 0 | 0.5 | 0.2 | 0 | 0.3 | 0 | 0 |
| $m_{2}(A)$ | 0 | 0.1 | 0 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0 | 0 | 0 |


|  |  | $m_{2}$ |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | $\{a\}, 0.1$ | $\{a, b\}, 0.4$ | $\{c\}, 0.5$ |
| $m_{1}$ | $\{b\}, 0.5$ | $\emptyset, 0.05$ | $\{b\}, 0.2$ | $\emptyset, 0.25$ |
|  | $\{a, 0.2$ | $\{a\}, 0.02$ | $\{a, b\}, 0.08$ | $\emptyset, 0.1$ |
|  | $\{a, c\}, 0.3$ | $\{a\}, 0.03$ | $\{a\}, 0.12$ | $\{c\}, 0.15$ |

The degree of conflict is $\kappa=0.05+0.25+0.1=0.4$. The combined mass function is

$$
\begin{aligned}
\left(m_{1} \oplus m_{2}\right)(\{a\}) & =(0.02+0.03+0.12) / 0.6=0.17 / 0.6 \\
\left(m_{1} \oplus m_{2}\right)(\{b\}) & =0.2 / 0.6 \\
\left(m_{1} \oplus m_{2}\right)(\{a, b\}) & =0.08 / 0.6 \\
\left(m_{1} \oplus m_{2}\right)(\{c\}) & =0.15 / 0.6 .
\end{aligned}
$$

## Dempster's rule

Properties

- Commutativity, associativity. Neutral element: $m_{\text {? }}$
- Generalization of intersection: if $m_{A}$ and $m_{B}$ are logical mass functions and $A \cap B \neq \emptyset$, then

$$
m_{A} \oplus m_{B}=m_{A \cap B}
$$

- If either $m_{1}$ or $m_{2}$ is Bayesian, then so is $m_{1} \oplus m_{2}$ (as the intersection of a singleton with another subset is either a singleton, or the empty set).


## Dempster's conditioning

- Conditioning is a special case, where a mass function $m$ is combined with a logical mass function $m_{A}$. Notation:

$$
m \oplus m_{A}=m(\cdot \mid A)
$$

- It can be shown that

$$
P I(B \mid A)=\frac{P I(A \cap B)}{P I(A)} .
$$

- Generalization of Bayes' conditioning: if $m$ is a Bayesian mass function and $m_{A}$ is a logical mass function, then $m \oplus m_{A}$ is a Bayesian mass function corresponding to the conditioning of $m$ by $A$


## Commonality function

- Commonality function: let $Q$ : $2^{\Omega} \rightarrow[0,1]$ be defined as

$$
Q(A)=\sum_{B \supseteq A} m(B), \quad \forall A \subseteq \Omega
$$

- Conversely,

$$
m(A)=\sum_{B \supseteq A}(-1)^{|B \backslash A|} Q(B)
$$

- $Q$ is another equivalent representation of a belief function.


## Commonality function and Dempster's rule

- Let $Q_{1}$ and $Q_{2}$ be the commonality functions associated to $m_{1}$ and $m_{2}$.
- Let $Q_{1} \oplus Q_{2}$ be the commonality function associated to $m_{1} \oplus m_{2}$.
- We have

$$
\begin{gathered}
\left(Q_{1} \oplus Q_{2}\right)(A)=\frac{1}{1-\kappa} Q_{1}(A) \cdot Q_{2}(A), \quad \forall A \subseteq \Omega, A \neq \emptyset \\
\left(Q_{1} \oplus Q_{2}\right)(\emptyset)=1
\end{gathered}
$$

- In particular, $p l(\omega)=Q(\{\omega\})$. Consequently,

$$
p l_{1} \oplus p l_{2} \propto(1-\kappa)^{-1} p l_{1} p l_{2} .
$$

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## Disjunctive rule

Definition and justification

- Let $\left(S_{1}, P_{1}, \Gamma_{1}\right)$ and $\left(S_{2}, P_{2}, \Gamma_{2}\right)$ be sources associated to two pieces of evidence
- If interpretation $s_{k} \in S_{k}$ holds and piece of evidence $k$ is reliable, then we can conclude that $X \in \Gamma_{k}\left(s_{k}\right)$
- If interpretation $s \in S_{1}$ and $s_{2} \in S_{2}$ both hold and we assume that at least one of the two pieces of evidence is reliable, then we can conclude that $X \in \Gamma_{1}\left(s_{1}\right) \cup \Gamma_{2}\left(s_{2}\right)$
- This leads to the TBM disjunctive rule:

$$
\left(m_{1} \cup m_{2}\right)(A)=\sum_{B \cup C=A} m_{1}(B) m_{2}(C), \quad \forall A \subseteq \Omega
$$

## Disjunctive rule

## Example

| $A$ | $\emptyset$ | $\{a\}$ | $\{b\}$ | $\{a, b\}$ | $\{c\}$ | $\{a, c\}$ | $\{b, c\}$ | $\{a, b, c\}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $m_{1}(A)$ | 0 | 0 | 0.5 | 0.2 | 0 | 0.3 | 0 | 0 |
| $m_{2}(A)$ | 0 | 0.1 | 0 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0 | 0 | 0 |


|  |  | $m_{2}$ |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | $\{a\}, 0.1$ | $\{a, b\}, 0.4$ | $\{c\}, 0.5$ |  |
| $m_{1}$ | $\{b\}, 0.5$ | $\{a, b\}, 0.05$ | $\{a, b\}, 0.2$ | $\{b, c\}, 0.25$ |  |
|  | $\{a, c\}, 0.3$ | $\{a, b\}, 0.02$ | $\{a, b\}, 0.08$ | $\{a, b, c\}, 0.1$ |  |
|  | $\{a, c\}, 0.03$ | $\{a, b, c\}, 0.12$ | $\{a, c\}, 0.15$ |  |  |

The resulting mass function is

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \left(m_{1} \cup m_{2}\right)(\{a, b\})=0.05+0.2+0.02+0.08=0.35 \\
& \left(m_{1} \cup m_{2}\right)(\{b, c\})=0.25 \\
& \left(m_{1} \cup m_{2}\right)(\{a, c\})=0.03+0.15=0.18 \\
& \quad\left(m_{1} \cup m_{2}\right)(\Omega)=0.1+0.12=0.22
\end{aligned}
$$

## Disjunctive rule

- Commutativity, associativity.
- No neutral element.
- $m_{\text {? }}$ is an absorbing element.
- Expression using belief functions:

$$
B e l_{1} \cup B e l_{2}=B e l_{1} \cdot B e l_{2}
$$

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## Definition

- In general, the disjunctive rule may be preferred in case of heavy conflict between the different pieces of evidence.
- An alternative rule, which is somehow intermediate between the disjunctive and conjunctive rules, has been proposed by Dubois and Prade (1988). It is defined as follows:

$$
\left(m_{1} \uplus m_{2}\right)(A)=\sum_{B \cap C=A} m_{1}(B) m_{2}(C)+\sum_{\{B \cap C=\emptyset, B \cup C=A\}} m_{1}(B) m_{2}(C),
$$

for all $A \subseteq \Omega, A \neq \emptyset$, and $\left(m_{1} \uplus m_{2}\right)(\emptyset)=0$.

## Example

| $A$ | $\emptyset$ | $\{a\}$ | $\{b\}$ | $\{a, b\}$ | $\{c\}$ | $\{a, c\}$ | $\{b, c\}$ | $\{a, b, c\}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $m_{1}(A)$ | 0 | 0 | 0.5 | 0.2 | 0 | 0.3 | 0 | 0 |
| $m_{2}(A)$ | 0 | 0.1 | 0 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0 | 0 | 0 |


|  |  | $m_{2}$ |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | $\{a\}, 0.1$ | $\{a, b\}, 0.4$ | $\{c\}, 0.5$ |
| $m_{1}$ | $\{b\}, 0.5$ | $\{a, b\}, 0.05$ | $\{b\}, 0.2$ | $\{b, c\}, 0.25$ |
|  | $\{a, c\}, 0.3$ | $\{a\}, 0.02$ | $\{a, b\}, 0.08$ | $\{a, b, c\}, 0.1$ |
|  | $\{a\}, 0.03$ | $\{a\}, 0.12$ | $\{c\}, 0.15$ |  |

$$
\begin{aligned}
\left(m_{1} \uplus m_{2}\right)(\{a, b\}) & =0.05+0.08=0.13 \\
\left(m_{1} \uplus m_{2}\right)(\{b\}) & =0.2 \\
\left(m_{1} \uplus m_{2}\right)(\{b, c\}) & =0.25 \\
\left(m_{1} \uplus m_{2}\right)(\{a\}) & =0.02+0.03+0.12=0.17 \\
\left(m_{1} \uplus m_{2}\right)(\{c\}) & =0.15 \\
\left(m_{1} \uplus m_{2}\right)(\Omega) & =0.1 .
\end{aligned}
$$

## Properties

- The DP rule boils down to the conjunctive and disjunctive rules when, respectively, the degree of conflict is equal to zero and one.
- In other cases, it has some intermediate behavior.
- It is not associative. If several pieces of evidence are available, they should be combined at once using an obvious $n$-ary extension of the above formula.


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## Introductory example

- Consider an urn with white $\left(\xi_{1}\right)$, red $\left(\xi_{2}\right)$ and black $\left(\xi_{3}\right)$ balls in proportions $p_{1}, p_{2}$ and $p_{3}$.
- Let $X \in \mathcal{X}=\left\{\xi_{1}, \xi_{2}, \xi_{3}\right\}$ be the color of a ball that will be drawn from the urn: belief on $X$ ?
- Two cases:
(1) We know the proportions $p_{k}$ : then $\operatorname{be}{ }^{\mathcal{X}}\left(\left\{\xi_{k}\right\}\right)=p_{k}$ (Hacking's Principle);
(2) We have observed the result of $n$ drawings from the urn with replacement, e.g. 5 white balls, 3 red balls and 2 black balls.
- How to build a belief function from data in the 2nd case ?
- A solution was described in
T. Denoeux. Constructing Belief Functions from Sample Data Using Multinomial Confidence Regions. International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 42(3):228-252, 2006.


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## Formalization

- Discrete variable $X \in \mathcal{X}=\left\{\xi_{1}, \ldots, \xi_{K}\right\}$ defined as the result of a random experiment.
- $X$ is characterized by an unknown frequency (probability) distribution $\mathbb{P}_{X}$.
- $\mathbb{P}_{X}(A)$ : limit frequency of the event $A \subseteq \mathcal{X}$ in an infinite sequence of trials.
- We have observed a realization $\mathbf{x}_{n}$ of an iid random sample $X_{n}=\left(X_{1}, \ldots, X_{n}\right)$ with parent distribution $\mathbb{P}_{X}$.
- Problem: build a belief function be $l^{\mathcal{X}}\left[\mathbf{x}_{n}\right]$ with well-defined properties with respect to the unknown frequency distribution $\mathbb{P}_{X} \rightarrow$ predictive belief function.


## Approach

- Let bel ${ }^{\mathcal{X}}\left[\mathbf{x}_{n}\right]$ be the BF on $X$ after observing a realization $\mathbf{x}_{n}$ of random sample $\mathbf{X}_{n}=\left(X_{1}, \ldots, X_{n}\right)$.
- Which properties should bel ${ }^{\mathcal{X}}\left[\mathbf{x}_{n}\right]$ verify with respect to $\mathbb{P}_{X}$ ?
- Hacking's principle (1965): if $\mathbb{P}_{X}$ is know, then bel ${ }^{\mathcal{X}}\left[\mathbf{x}_{n}\right]=\mathbb{P}_{X}$.
- Weak version:

$$
\forall A \subseteq \mathcal{X}, \quad \text { be } I^{\mathcal{X}}\left[\mathbf{X}_{n}\right](A) \xrightarrow{P} \mathbb{P}_{X}(A), \text { as } n \rightarrow \infty .
$$

(Requirement $R_{1}$ )

## Approach (continued)

- Least Commitment Principle: for fixed $n$, bel ${ }^{\mathcal{X}}\left[\mathbf{x}_{n}\right]$ should be less informative that $\mathbb{P}_{X}$ :

$$
\text { bel }{ }^{\mathcal{X}}\left[\mathbf{x}_{n}\right](A) \leq \mathbb{P}_{X}(A), \quad \forall A \subseteq \mathcal{X} .
$$

- This condition is too restrictive (it leads to the vacuous BF).
- Weaker condition ((Requirement $R_{2}$ ):

$$
\mathbb{P}\left(\text { bel }{ }^{\mathcal{X}}\left[\mathbf{X}_{n}\right] \leq \mathbb{P}_{X}\right) \geq 1-\alpha,
$$

for some $\alpha \in(0,1)$.

## Meaning of Requirement $R_{2}$

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \mathbf{x}_{n}=\left(x_{1}, \ldots, x_{n}\right) \rightarrow \operatorname{bel}^{\mathcal{X}}\left[\mathbf{x}_{n}\right] \\
& \mathbf{x}_{n}^{\prime}=\left(x_{1}^{\prime}, \ldots, x_{n}^{\prime}\right) \rightarrow \operatorname{bel}^{\mathcal{X}}\left[\mathbf{x}_{n}^{\prime}\right] \\
& \mathbf{x}_{n}^{\prime \prime}=\left(x_{1}^{\prime \prime}, \ldots, x_{n}^{\prime \prime}\right) \rightarrow \operatorname{bel}^{\mathcal{X}}\left[\mathbf{x}_{n}^{\prime \prime}\right]
\end{aligned}
$$

- As the number of realizations of the random sample tends to $\infty$, the proportion of belief functions less committed than $\mathbb{P}_{X}$ should tend to $1-\alpha$.
- To achieve this property: use of a multinomial confidence region.


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## Multinomial Confidence Region

- Let $N_{k}=\#\left\{i \mid X_{i}=\xi_{k}\right\}$. Vector $\mathbf{N}=\left(N_{1}, \ldots, N_{K}\right)$ has a multinomial distribution $\mathcal{M}\left(n, p_{1}, \ldots, p_{K}\right)$, with $p_{k}=\mathbb{P}_{X}\left(\left\{\xi_{k}\right\}\right)$.
- Let $\mathcal{S}(\mathbf{N}) \subseteq[0,1]^{K}$ a random region of $[0,1]^{K}$. It is a confidence region for $\mathbf{p}$ at level $1-\alpha$ if

$$
\mathbb{P}(\mathcal{S}(\mathbf{N}) \ni \mathbf{p}) \geq 1-\alpha
$$

- $\mathcal{S}(\mathbf{N})$ is an asymptotic confidence region if the above inequality holds in the limit as $n \rightarrow \infty$.
- Simultaneous confidence intervals: $\mathcal{S}(\mathbf{N})=\left[P_{1}^{-}, P_{1}^{+}\right] \times \ldots \times\left[P_{K}^{-}, P_{K}^{+}\right]$


## Multinomial Conf. Region (cont.)

- Goodman's simultaneous confidence intervals:

$$
\begin{array}{r}
P_{k}^{-}=\frac{b+2 N_{k}-\sqrt{\Delta_{k}}}{2(n+b)}, \\
P_{k}^{+}=\frac{b+2 N_{k}+\sqrt{\Delta_{k}}}{2(n+b)}, \\
\text { with } b=\chi_{1 ; 1-\alpha / K}^{2} \text { and } \Delta_{k}=b\left(b+\frac{4 N_{k}\left(n-N_{k}\right)}{n}\right) .
\end{array}
$$

## Example

- 220 psychiatric patients categorized as either neurotic, depressed, schizophrenic or having a personality disorder.
- Observed counts: $\mathbf{n}=(91,49,37,43)$.
- Goodman' confidence intervals at confidence level $1-\alpha=0.95$ :

| Diagnosis | $N_{k} / n$ | $P_{k}^{-}$ | $P_{k}^{+}$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Neurotic | 0.41 | 0.33 | 0.50 |
| Depressed | 0.22 | 0.16 | 0.30 |
| Schizophrenic | 0.17 | 0.11 | 0.24 |
| Personality disorder | 0.20 | 0.14 | 0.27 |

## From Conf. Regions to Lower Probabilties

- To each $\mathbf{p}=\left(p_{1}, \ldots, p_{K}\right)$ corresponds a probability measure $\mathbb{P}_{X}$.
- Consequently, $\mathcal{S}(\mathbf{N})$ may be seen as defining a family of probability measures, uniquely defined by the following lower probability measure:

$$
P^{-}(A)=\max \left(\sum_{\xi_{k} \in A} P_{k}^{-}, 1-\sum_{\xi_{k} \notin A} P_{k}^{+}\right)
$$

- $P^{-}$satisfies requirements $R_{1}$ and $R_{2}$ :
- $P^{-}(A) \xrightarrow{P} \mathbb{P}_{x}(A)$ as $n \rightarrow \infty$, for all $A \subseteq \mathcal{X}$,
- $\mathbb{P}\left(P^{-} \leq \mathbb{P}_{X}\right) \geq 1-\alpha$.


## From Lower Probabilities to Belief Functions

- Is $P^{-}$a belief function?
- If $K=2$ or $K=3, P^{-}$is a belief function.
- Case $K=2$ :

$$
\begin{gathered}
m^{\mathcal{X}}\left(\left\{\xi_{1}\right\}\right)=P_{1}^{-}, \quad m^{\mathcal{X}}\left(\left\{\xi_{2}\right\}\right)=P_{2}^{-} \\
m^{\mathcal{X}}(\mathcal{X})=1-P_{1}^{-}-P_{2}^{-} .
\end{gathered}
$$

- If $K>3, P^{-}$is not a belief function in general. We can find the most committed belief function satisfying be $l^{\mathcal{X}} \leq P^{-}$by solving a linear optimization problem.
- The solution satisfies requirements $R_{1}$ and $R_{2}$ : it is a predictive belief function (at confidence level $1-\alpha$ ).


## Example 1

- $K=2, p_{1}=\mathbb{P}_{X}\left(\left\{\xi_{1}\right\}\right)=0.3$. 100 realizations of a random sample of size $n=30 \rightarrow 100$ predictive belief functions at level $1-\alpha=0.95$.



## Example 2: Psychiatric Data

| $A$ | $P^{-}(A)$ | bel $^{\mathcal{X} *}(A)$ | $m^{\mathcal{X}^{*}}(A)$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\left\{\xi_{1}\right\}$ | 0.33 | 0.33 | 0.33 |
| $\left\{\xi_{2}\right\}$ | 0.16 | 0.14 | 0.14 |
| $\left\{\xi_{1}, \xi_{2}\right\}$ | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0.021 |
| $\left\{\xi_{3}\right\}$ | 0.11 | 0.097 | 0.097 |
| $\left\{\xi_{1}, \xi_{3}\right\}$ | 0.45 | 0.45 | 0.020 |
| $\left\{\xi_{2}, \xi_{3}\right\}$ | 0.28 | 0.28 | 0.036 |
| $\vdots$ | $\vdots$ | $\vdots$ | $\vdots$ |
| $\left\{\xi_{1}, \xi_{3}, \xi_{4}\right\}$ | 0.70 | 0.66 | 0.038 |
| $\left\{\xi_{2}, \xi_{3}, \xi_{4}\right\}$ | 0.50 | 0.48 | 0.019 |
| $\mathcal{X}$ | 1 | 1 | 0 |

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## Case of ordered data

- Assume $\mathcal{X}$ is ordered: $\xi_{1}<\ldots<\xi_{K}$.
- The focal sets of bel ${ }^{\mathcal{X}}\left[\mathbf{x}_{n}\right]$ can be constrained to be intervals $A_{k, r}=\left\{\xi_{k}, \ldots, \xi_{r}\right\}$.
- Under this additional constraint, an analytical solution to the previous optimization problem can be found:

$$
\begin{gathered}
m^{\mathcal{X} *}\left(A_{k, k}\right)=P_{k}^{-} \\
m^{\mathcal{X} *}\left(A_{k, k+1}\right)=P^{-}\left(A_{k, k+1}\right)-P^{-}\left(A_{k+1, k+1}\right)-P^{-}\left(A_{k, k}\right), \\
m^{\mathcal{X} *}\left(A_{k, r}\right)=P^{-}\left(A_{k, r}\right)-P^{-}\left(A_{k+1, r}\right)-P^{-}\left(A_{k, r-1}\right)+P^{-}\left(A_{k+1, r-1}\right)
\end{gathered}
$$

for $r>k+1$, and $m^{\mathcal{X} *}(B)=0$, for all $B \notin \mathcal{I}$.

## Example: rain data

- January precipitation in Arizona (in inches), recorded during the period 1895-2004.

| class $\xi_{k}$ | $n_{k}$ | $n_{k} / n$ | $p_{k}^{-}$ | $p_{k}^{+}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $<0.75$ | 48 | 0.44 | 0.32 | 0.56 |
| $[0.75,1.25)$ | 17 | 0.15 | 0.085 | 0.27 |
| $[1.25,1.75)$ | 19 | 0.17 | 0.098 | 0.29 |
| $[1.75,2.25)$ | 11 | 0.10 | 0.047 | 0.20 |
| $[2.25,2.75)$ | 6 | 0.055 | 0.020 | 0.14 |
| $\geq 2.75$ | 9 | 0.082 | 0.035 | 0.18 |

- Degree of belief that the precipitation in Arizona next January will exceed, say, 2.25 inches?


## Rain data: Result

| $m\left(A_{k, r}\right)$ | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | 0.32 | 0 | 0 | 0.13 | 0.11 | 0 |
| 2 | - | 0.085 | 0 | 0 | 0.012 | 0.14 |
| 3 | - | - | 0.098 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 4 | - | - | - | 0.047 | 0 | 0 |
| 5 | - | - | - | - | 0.020 | 0 |
| 6 | - | - | - | - | - | 0.035 |

- We get bel ${ }^{\mathcal{X}}(X \geq 2.25)=$ bel $^{\mathcal{X} *}\left(\left\{\xi_{5}, \xi_{6}\right\}\right)=0.055$ and $p l(X \geq 2.25)=0.317$.
- In $95 \%$ of cases, the interval $\left[b e I^{\mathcal{X}}(A), p I^{\mathcal{X}}(A)\right]$ computed using this method contains $\mathbb{P}_{X}(A)$.


## Conclusions

- A "frequentist" approach, based on multinomial confidence regions, for building a belief function quantifying the uncertainty about a discrete random variable $X$ with unknown probability distribution, based on observed data.
- Two "reasonable" properties of the solution with respect to the true frequency distribution $\mathbb{P}_{X}$ :
- it is less committed than $\mathbb{P}_{x}$ with some user-defined probability, and
- it converges towards $\mathbb{P}_{x}$ in probability as the size of the sample tends to infinity.

