

Representation and combination of evidence

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Outline

- 1 Representation of evidence
 - Mass functions
 - Belief and plausibility functions
- 2 Relations with alternative theories
 - Possibility theory
 - Imprecise probabilities
- 3 Combination of evidence
 - Dempster's rule
 - Disjunctive rule
 - Dubois-Prade rule

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Mass function

Definition

- Let X be a variable taking values in a finite set Ω (**frame of discernment**)
- Evidence about X may be represented by a **mass function** $m : 2^\Omega \rightarrow [0, 1]$ such that

$$\sum_{A \subseteq \Omega} m(A) = 1$$

- Every A of Ω such that $m(A) > 0$ is a **focal set** of m
- m is said to be **normalized** if $m(\emptyset) = 0$. This property will be assumed hereafter, unless otherwise specified

Example


- When traveling by train, you find a page of a used newspaper, with an article announcing rain for tomorrow
- The date of the newspaper is missing. If it is today's newspaper, you know that it will rain tomorrow (assuming the forecast is perfectly reliable). If not, you know nothing
- Assume your subjective probability that this is today's paper is 0.8
- The frame of discernment is $\Omega = \{\text{rain}, \neg\text{rain}\}$
- The evidence can be represented by the following mass function

$$m(\{\text{rain}\}) = 0.8, \quad m(\{\text{rain}, \neg\text{rain}\}) = 0.2$$

- The mass 0.2 is not committed to $\{\neg\text{rain}\}$, because there is no evidence that it will not rain

Mass function

Source



- A mass function m on Ω may be viewed as arising from
 - A set $S = \{s_1, \dots, s_r\}$ of states (interpretations)
 - A **probability measure** P on S
 - A **multi-valued mapping** $\Gamma : S \rightarrow 2^\Omega$
- The four-tuple $(S, 2^S, P, \Gamma)$ is called a **source** for m
- Meaning: under interpretation s_i , the evidence tells us that $X \in \Gamma(s_i)$, and nothing more. The probability $P(\{s_i\})$ is transferred to $A_i = \Gamma(s_i)$
- $m(A)$ is the **probability of knowing that $X \in A$, and nothing more**, given the available evidence

Mass functions

Special cases

- If the evidence tells us that $X \in A$ for sure and nothing more, for some $A \subseteq \Omega$, then we have a **logical** mass function m_A such that $m_A(A) = 1$
 - m_A is equivalent to A
 - Special case: m_{\emptyset} , the **vacuous** mass function, represents total ignorance
- If each interpretation s_i of the evidence points to a single value of X , then all focal sets are singletons and m is said to be **Bayesian**. It is equivalent to a probability distribution
- A Dempster-Shafer mass function can thus be seen as
 - a generalized set
 - a generalized probability distribution

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Belief function

- If interpretation s holds and $\Gamma(s) \subseteq A$ for some $A \subseteq \Omega$, we say that **the evidence supports A** .
- The probability that the evidence supports A is thus

$$\begin{aligned} Bel(A) &= P(\{s \in S \mid \Gamma(s) \subseteq A\}) \\ &= \sum_{B \subseteq A} m(B). \end{aligned}$$

- It can be interpreted as the **total degree of support in A** , or as a **degree of belief** that the truth is in A .
- The function $Bel : 2^\Omega \rightarrow [0, 1]$ is called a **belief function**

Plausibility function

- We can also consider the degree of support in \bar{A} ,

$$Bel(\bar{A}) = \sum_{B \subseteq \bar{A}} m(B) = \sum_{B \cap A = \emptyset} m(B)$$

- It is a measure of **doubt** in A (we doubt A if the complement of A is supported).
- The **plausibility of A** is defined as

$$Pl(A) = 1 - Bel(\bar{A}) = \sum_{B \cap A \neq \emptyset} m(B).$$

It is high when the complement \bar{A} is not supported by the evidence.

- The function $Pl : 2^\Omega \rightarrow [0, 1]$ is called a **plausibility function**

Two-dimensional representation

- The uncertainty on a proposition A is represented by two numbers: $Bel(A)$ and $Pl(A)$, with $Bel(A) \leq Pl(A)$
- The intervals $[Bel(A), Pl(A)]$ have maximum length when $m = m_?$ is vacuous: then, $Bel(A) = 0$ for all $A \neq \Omega$, and $Pl(A) = 1$ for all $A \neq \emptyset$.
- The intervals $[Bel(A), Pl(A)]$ have minimum length when m is Bayesian. Then, $Bel(A) = Pl(A)$ for all A , and Bel is a probability measure.

Example

A	\emptyset	{rain}	{¬rain}	{rain, ¬rain}
$m(A)$	0	0.8	0	0.2
$Bel(A)$	0	0.8	0	1
$pl(A)$	0	1	0.2	1

- We observe that

$$Bel(A \cup B) \geq Bel(A) + Bel(B) - Bel(A \cap B)$$

$$Pl(A \cup B) \leq Pl(A) + Pl(B) - Pl(A \cap B)$$

Characterization of belief and plausibility functions

Belief function

- Function Bel is a **completely monotone capacity**: it verifies $Bel(\emptyset) = 0$, $Bel(\Omega) = 1$ and

$$Bel\left(\bigcup_{i=1}^k A_i\right) \geq \sum_{\emptyset \neq I \subseteq \{1, \dots, k\}} (-1)^{|I|+1} Bel\left(\bigcap_{i \in I} A_i\right)$$

for any $k \geq 2$ and for any family A_1, \dots, A_k in 2^Ω

- Conversely, to any completely monotone capacity Bel corresponds a unique mass function m such that

$$m(A) = \sum_{\emptyset \neq B \subseteq A} (-1)^{|A|-|B|} Bel(B), \quad \forall A \subseteq \Omega$$

Characterization of belief and plausibility functions

Plausibility function

A function $Pl : 2^\Omega \rightarrow [0, 1]$ is a plausibility function iff it is a completely alternating capacity, i.e., iff it satisfies the following conditions:

- 1 $Pl(\emptyset) = 0$;
- 2 $Pl(\Omega) = 1$;
- 3 For any $k \geq 2$ and any collection A_1, \dots, A_k of subsets of Ω ,

$$Pl\left(\bigcap_{i=1}^k A_i\right) \leq \sum_{\emptyset \neq I \subseteq \{1, \dots, k\}} (-1)^{|I|+1} Pl\left(\bigcup_{i \in I} A_i\right).$$

Wine/water paradox revisited

- Let X denote the ratio of wine to water. All we know is that $X \in [1/3, 3]$. This is modeled by the logical mass function m_X such that $m_X([1/3, 3]) = 1$. Consequently:

$$Bel_X([2, 3]) = 0, \quad Pl_X([2, 3]) = 1$$

- Now, let $Y = 1/X$ denote the ratio of water to wine. All we know is that $Y \in [1/3, 3]$. This is modeled by the logical mass function m_Y such that $m_Y([1/3, 3]) = 1$. Consequently:

$$Bel_Y([1/3, 1/2]) = 0, \quad Pl_Y([1/3, 1/2]) = 1$$

Relations between m , Bel et Pl

- Let m be a mass function, Bel and Pl the corresponding belief and plausibility functions
- For all $A \subseteq \Omega$,

$$Bel(A) = 1 - Pl(\bar{A})$$

$$m(A) = \sum_{\emptyset \neq B \subseteq A} (-1)^{|A|-|B|} Bel(B)$$

$$m(A) = \sum_{B \subseteq A} (-1)^{|A|-|B|+1} Pl(\bar{B})$$

- m , Bel et Pl are thus **three equivalent representations** of
 - a piece of evidence or, equivalently
 - a state of belief induced by this evidence

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Consonant belief function

- When the focal sets of m are nested: $A_1 \subset A_2 \subset \dots \subset A_r$, m is said to be **consonant**
- The following relations then hold, for all $A, B \subseteq \Omega$,

$$Pl(A \cup B) = \max(Pl(A), Pl(B))$$

$$Bel(A \cap B) = \min(Bel(A), Bel(B))$$

- Pl is this a **possibility measure**, and Bel is the dual **necessity measure**

Contour function

- The **contour function** of a belief function Bel is defined by

$$pl(\omega) = PI(\{\omega\}), \quad \forall \omega \in \Omega$$

- When Bel is consonant, it can be recovered from its contour function,

$$PI(A) = \max_{\omega \in A} pl(\omega).$$

- The contour function is then a **possibility distribution**
- The theory of belief function can thus be considered as **more expressive** than possibility theory

From the contour function to the mass function

- Let pl be a contour on the frame $\Omega = \{\omega_1, \dots, \omega_n\}$, with elements arranged by decreasing order of plausibility, i.e.,

$$1 = pl(\omega_1) \geq pl(\omega_2) \geq \dots \geq pl(\omega_n),$$

and let A_i denote the set $\{\omega_1, \dots, \omega_i\}$, for $1 \leq i \leq n$.

- Then, the corresponding mass function m is

$$\begin{aligned} m(A_i) &= pl(\omega_i) - pl(\omega_{i+1}), \quad 1 \leq i \leq n-1, \\ m(\Omega) &= pl(\omega_n). \end{aligned}$$

Example

- Consider, for instance, the following contour distribution defined on the frame $\Omega = \{a, b, c, d\}$:

ω	a	b	c	d
$pl(\omega)$	0.3	0.5	1	0.7

- The corresponding mass function is

$$m(\{c\}) = 1 - 0.7 = 0.3$$

$$m(\{c, d\}) = 0.7 - 0.5 = 0.2$$

$$m(\{c, d, b\}) = 0.5 - 0.3 = 0.2$$

$$m(\{c, d, b, a\}) = 0.3.$$

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Credal set

- A probability measure P on Ω is said to be **compatible** with Bel if

$$Bel(A) \leq P(A)$$

for all $A \subseteq \Omega$

- Equivalently, $P(A) \leq Pl(A)$ for all $A \subseteq \Omega$
- The set $\mathcal{P}(m)$ of probability measures compatible with m is called the **credal set** of m

$$\mathcal{P}(Bel) = \{P : \forall A \subseteq \Omega, Bel(A) \leq P(A)\}$$

Construction of $\mathcal{P}(Bel)$

- An arbitrary element of $\mathcal{P}(Bel)$ can be obtained by distributing each mass $m(A)$ among the elements of A .
- More precisely, let $\alpha(\omega, A)$ be the fraction of $m(A)$ allocated to the element ω . We have

$$\sum_{\omega \in A} \alpha(\omega, A) = m(A).$$

- By summing up the numbers $\alpha(\omega, A)$ for each ω , we get a probability mass function on Ω ,

$$p_\alpha(\omega) = \sum_{A \ni \omega} \alpha(\omega, A).$$

- It can be verified that

$$P_\alpha(A) = \sum_{\omega \in A} p_\alpha(\omega) \geq Bel(A),$$

for all $A \subseteq \Omega$.

Belief functions are coherent lower probabilities

- It can be shown (Dempster, 1967) that any element of the credal set $\mathcal{P}(Bel)$ can be obtained in that way.
- Furthermore, the bounds in the inequalities $Bel(A) \leq P(A)$ and $P(A) \leq Pl(A)$ are attained. We thus have, for all $A \subseteq \Omega$,

$$Bel(A) = \min_{P \in \mathcal{P}(Bel)} P(A)$$

$$Pl(A) = \max_{P \in \mathcal{P}(Bel)} P(A)$$

- We say that Bel is a **coherent lower probability**.
- Not all lower envelopes of sets of probability measures are belief functions!

A counterexample

- Suppose a fair coin is tossed twice, in such a way that the outcome of the second toss may depend on the outcome of the first toss.
- The outcome of the experiment can be denoted by $\Omega = \{(H, H), (H, T), (T, H), (T, T)\}$.
- Let $H_1 = \{(H, H), (H, T)\}$ and $H_2 = \{(H, H), (T, H)\}$ the events that we get Heads in the first and second toss, respectively.
- Let \mathcal{P} be the set of probability measures on Ω which assign $P(H_1) = P(H_2) = 1/2$ and have an arbitrary degree of dependence between tosses.
- Let P_* be the lower envelope of \mathcal{P} .

A counterexample – continued

- It is clear that $P_*(H_1) = 1/2$, $P_*(H_2) = 1/2$ and $P_*(H_1 \cap H_2) = 0$ (as the occurrence Heads in the first toss may never lead to getting Heads in the second toss).
- Now, in the case of complete positive dependence, $P(H_1 \cup H_2) = P(H_1) = 1/2$, hence $P_*(H_1 \cup H_2) \leq 1/2$.
- We thus have

$$P_*(H_1 \cup H_2) < P_*(H_1) + P_*(H_2) - P_*(H_1 \cap H_2),$$

which violates the complete monotonicity condition for $k = 2$.

Two different theories

- Mathematically, the notion of coherent lower probability is thus more general than that of belief function.
- However, the definition of the credal set associated with a belief function is purely formal, as these probabilities have no particular interpretation in our framework.
- The theory of belief functions is not a theory of imprecise probabilities.

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
Dempster's rule

Rain example continued

- The first item of evidence gave us: $m_1(\{\text{rain}\}) = 0.8$, $m_1(\Omega) = 0.2$
- New piece of evidence: upon arriving in the train station, you watch the weather bulletin on TV, saying that it will not rain tomorrow, and the forecast has 60 % reliability.
- This second piece of evidence can be represented by the mass function: $m_2(\{\neg\text{rain}\}) = 0.6$, $m_2(\Omega) = 0.4$
- How to combine these two pieces of evidence?

Dempster's rule

Justification



- If interpretations $s_1 \in S_1$ and $s_2 \in S_2$ both hold, then $X \in \Gamma_1(s_1) \cap \Gamma_2(s_2)$
- If the two pieces of evidence are **independent**, then the probability that s_1 and s_2 both hold is $P_1(\{s_1\})P_2(\{s_2\})$
- If $\Gamma_1(s_1) \cap \Gamma_2(s_2) = \emptyset$, we know that s_1 and s_2 cannot hold simultaneously
- The joint probability distribution on $S_1 \times S_2$ must be conditioned to eliminate such pairs

Computation

	reliable (0.6)	not reliable (0.4)
today (0.8)	$\emptyset, 0.48$	$\{\text{rain}\}, 0.32$
not today (0.2)	$\{\neg\text{rain}\}, 0.12$	$\Omega, 0.08$

We then get the following combined mass function,

$$m(\{\text{rain}\}) = 0.32/0.52 \approx 0.62$$

$$m(\{\neg\text{rain}\}) = 0.12/0.52 \approx 0.23$$

$$m(\Omega) = 0.08/0.52 \approx 0.15$$

Dempster's rule

Definition

- Let m_1 and m_2 be two mass functions and

$$\kappa = \sum_{B \cap C = \emptyset} m_1(B)m_2(C)$$

their **degree of conflict**

- If $\kappa < 1$, then m_1 and m_2 can be combined as

$$(m_1 \oplus m_2)(A) = \frac{1}{1 - \kappa} \sum_{B \cap C = A} m_1(B)m_2(C), \quad \forall A \neq \emptyset$$

and $(m_1 \oplus m_2)(\emptyset) = 0$

Another example

A	\emptyset	$\{a\}$	$\{b\}$	$\{a, b\}$	$\{c\}$	$\{a, c\}$	$\{b, c\}$	$\{a, b, c\}$
$m_1(A)$	0	0	0.5	0.2	0	0.3	0	0
$m_2(A)$	0	0.1	0	0.4	0.5	0	0	0

		m_2		
		$\{a\}, 0.1$	$\{a, b\}, 0.4$	$\{c\}, 0.5$
m_1	$\{b\}, 0.5$	$\emptyset, 0.05$	$\{b\}, 0.2$	$\emptyset, 0.25$
	$\{a, b\}, 0.2$	$\{a\}, 0.02$	$\{a, b\}, 0.08$	$\emptyset, 0.1$
	$\{a, c\}, 0.3$	$\{a\}, 0.03$	$\{a\}, 0.12$	$\{c\}, 0.15$

The degree of conflict is $\kappa = 0.05 + 0.25 + 0.1 = 0.4$. The combined mass function is

$$(m_1 \oplus m_2)(\{a\}) = (0.02 + 0.03 + 0.12)/0.6 = 0.17/0.6$$

$$(m_1 \oplus m_2)(\{b\}) = 0.2/0.6$$

$$(m_1 \oplus m_2)(\{a, b\}) = 0.08/0.6$$

$$(m_1 \oplus m_2)(\{c\}) = 0.15/0.6.$$

Dempster's rule

Properties

- Commutativity, associativity. Neutral element: m_γ
- Generalization of **intersection**: if m_A and m_B are logical mass functions and $A \cap B \neq \emptyset$, then

$$m_A \oplus m_B = m_{A \cap B}$$

- If either m_1 or m_2 is Bayesian, then so is $m_1 \oplus m_2$ (as the intersection of a singleton with another subset is either a singleton, or the empty set).

Dempster's conditioning

- Conditioning is a special case, where a mass function m is combined with a logical mass function m_A . Notation:

$$m \oplus m_A = m(\cdot|A)$$

- It can be shown that

$$PI(B|A) = \frac{PI(A \cap B)}{PI(A)}.$$

- Generalization of **Bayes' conditioning**: if m is a Bayesian mass function and m_A is a logical mass function, then $m \oplus m_A$ is a Bayesian mass function corresponding to the conditioning of m by A

Recovering Jeffrey's conditioning

- Jeffrey's conditioning is also recovered as a special case where:
 - We start with an additive probability measure P ;
 - Given a partition E_1, \dots, E_n , we receive new evidence, represented by a belief function Bel whose focal sets are all unions of E_i 's.
- The combined belief function $P \oplus Bel$ is Bayesian. Let $q_i = (P \oplus Bel)(E_i)$.
- Then, for all $A \subseteq \Omega$,

$$(P \oplus Bel)(A) = \sum_{i=1}^n q_i P(A|E_i)$$

Commonality function

- **Commonality function:** let $Q : 2^\Omega \rightarrow [0, 1]$ be defined as

$$Q(A) = \sum_{B \supseteq A} m(B), \quad \forall A \subseteq \Omega$$

- Conversely,

$$m(A) = \sum_{B \supseteq A} (-1)^{|B \setminus A|} Q(B)$$

- Q is another equivalent representation of a belief function.

Commonality function and Dempster's rule

- Let Q_1 and Q_2 be the commonality functions associated to m_1 and m_2 .
- Let $Q_1 \oplus Q_2$ be the commonality function associated to $m_1 \oplus m_2$.
- We have

$$(Q_1 \oplus Q_2)(A) = \frac{1}{1 - \kappa} Q_1(A) \cdot Q_2(A), \quad \forall A \subseteq \Omega, A \neq \emptyset$$

$$(Q_1 \oplus Q_2)(\emptyset) = 1$$

- In particular, $pI(\omega) = Q(\{\omega\})$. Consequently,

$$pI_1 \oplus pI_2 \propto (1 - \kappa)^{-1} pI_1 pI_2.$$

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Disjunctive rule

Definition and justification

- Let (S_1, P_1, Γ_1) and (S_2, P_2, Γ_2) be sources associated to two pieces of evidence
- If interpretation $s_k \in S_k$ holds **and piece of evidence k is reliable**, then we can conclude that $X \in \Gamma_k(s_k)$
- If interpretation $s \in S_1$ and $s_2 \in S_2$ both hold and we assume that **at least one of the two pieces of evidence is reliable**, then we can conclude that $X \in \Gamma_1(s_1) \cup \Gamma_2(s_2)$
- This leads to the **TBM disjunctive rule**:

$$(m_1 \cup m_2)(A) = \sum_{B \cup C = A} m_1(B)m_2(C), \quad \forall A \subseteq \Omega$$

Disjunctive rule

Example

A	\emptyset	$\{a\}$	$\{b\}$	$\{a, b\}$	$\{c\}$	$\{a, c\}$	$\{b, c\}$	$\{a, b, c\}$
$m_1(A)$	0	0	0.5	0.2	0	0.3	0	0
$m_2(A)$	0	0.1	0	0.4	0.5	0	0	0

		m_2		
		$\{a\}, 0.1$	$\{a, b\}, 0.4$	$\{c\}, 0.5$
m_1	$\{b\}, 0.5$	$\{a, b\}, 0.05$	$\{a, b\}, 0.2$	$\{b, c\}, 0.25$
	$\{a, b\}, 0.2$	$\{a, b\}, 0.02$	$\{a, b\}, 0.08$	$\{a, b, c\}, 0.1$
	$\{a, c\}, 0.3$	$\{a, c\}, 0.03$	$\{a, b, c\}, 0.12$	$\{a, c\}, 0.15$

The resulting mass function is

$$(m_1 \cup m_2)(\{a, b\}) = 0.05 + 0.2 + 0.02 + 0.08 = 0.35$$

$$(m_1 \cup m_2)(\{b, c\}) = 0.25$$

$$(m_1 \cup m_2)(\{a, c\}) = 0.03 + 0.15 = 0.18$$

$$(m_1 \cup m_2)(\Omega) = 0.1 + 0.12 = 0.22.$$

Disjunctive rule

Properties

- Commutativity, associativity.
- No neutral element.
- $m_?$ is an absorbing element.
- Expression using belief functions:

$$Bel_1 \cup Bel_2 = Bel_1 \cdot Bel_2$$

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Definition

- In general, the disjunctive rule may be preferred in case of heavy conflict between the different pieces of evidence.
- An alternative rule, which is somehow intermediate between the disjunctive and conjunctive rules, has been proposed by Dubois and Prade (1988). It is defined as follows:

$$(m_1 \uplus m_2)(A) = \sum_{B \cap C = A} m_1(B)m_2(C) + \sum_{\{B \cap C = \emptyset, B \cup C = A\}} m_1(B)m_2(C),$$

for all $A \subseteq \Omega$, $A \neq \emptyset$, and $(m_1 \uplus m_2)(\emptyset) = 0$.

Example

A	\emptyset	$\{a\}$	$\{b\}$	$\{a, b\}$	$\{c\}$	$\{a, c\}$	$\{b, c\}$	$\{a, b, c\}$
$m_1(A)$	0	0	0.5	0.2	0	0.3	0	0
$m_2(A)$	0	0.1	0	0.4	0.5	0	0	0

		m_2		
		$\{a\}, 0.1$	$\{a, b\}, 0.4$	$\{c\}, 0.5$
m_1	$\{b\}, 0.5$	$\{a, b\}, 0.05$	$\{b\}, 0.2$	$\{b, c\}, 0.25$
	$\{a, b\}, 0.2$	$\{a\}, 0.02$	$\{a, b\}, 0.08$	$\{a, b, c\}, 0.1$
	$\{a, c\}, 0.3$	$\{a\}, 0.03$	$\{a\}, 0.12$	$\{c\}, 0.15$

$$(m_1 \uplus m_2)(\{a, b\}) = 0.05 + 0.08 = 0.13$$

$$(m_1 \uplus m_2)(\{b\}) = 0.2$$

$$(m_1 \uplus m_2)(\{b, c\}) = 0.25$$

$$(m_1 \uplus m_2)(\{a\}) = 0.02 + 0.03 + 0.12 = 0.17$$

$$(m_1 \uplus m_2)(\{c\}) = 0.15$$

$$(m_1 \uplus m_2)(\Omega) = 0.1.$$

Properties

- The DP rule boils down to the conjunctive and disjunctive rules when, respectively, the degree of conflict is equal to zero and one.
- In other cases, it has some intermediate behavior.
- It is not associative. If several pieces of evidence are available, they should be combined at once using an obvious n -ary extension of the above formula.