

Introduction to belief functions

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Contents of this lecture

- 1 Fundamental concepts: belief, plausibility, commonality, conditioning, basic combination rules.
- 2 Some more advanced concepts: informational ordering, cautious rule, compatible frames.

Theory of belief functions

History


- A formal framework for representing and reasoning with uncertain information.
- Also known as **Dempster-Shafer (DS) theory** or **Evidence theory**.
- Originates from the work of Dempster (1968) in the context of **statistical inference**.
- Formalized by Shafer (1976) as a **theory of evidence**.
- Popularized and developed by Smets in the 1980's and 1990's as the **"Transferable Belief Model"**.
- Starting from the 1990's, **growing number of applications** in information fusion, knowledge representation, machine learning (classification, clustering), reliability and risk analysis, etc.

Theory of belief functions

Main idea

- The theory of belief functions extends both **logical/set-based** formalisms (such as Propositional Logic and Interval Analysis) and **Probability Theory**:
 - A belief function may be viewed both as a **generalized set** and as a **nonadditive measure**
 - The theory includes extensions of **probabilistic notions** (conditioning, marginalization) and **set-theoretic notions** (intersection, union, inclusion, etc.).
- DS reasoning produces the same results as probabilistic reasoning or interval analysis when provided with the same information.
- However, the **greater expressive power** of the theory of belief functions allows us to represent what we know in a more faithful way.

Relationships with other theories



Outline

- 1 Basic notions
 - Mass functions
 - Belief and plausibility functions
 - Dempster's rule
- 2 Selected advanced topics
 - Informational orderings
 - Cautious rule
 - Compatible frames

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Mass function

Definition

Definition (Frame of discernment, mass function, focal set)


Let Ω be a finite set called a *frame of discernment*. A *mass function* on Ω is a mapping $m : 2^\Omega \rightarrow [0, 1]$ such that

$$\sum_{A \subseteq \Omega} m(A) = 1$$

Every subset A of Ω such that $m(A) > 0$ is a *focal set* of m . If $m(\emptyset) = 0$, m is said to be *normalized*.

In DS theory, a mass function is used to represent *evidence about a variable* X taking values in Ω .


Example: road scene analysis



Example: road scene analysis (continued)

- Let X be the type of object in some region of the image, and $\Omega = \{G, R, T, O, S\}$, corresponding to the possibilities **G**rass, **R**oad, **T**ree/Bush, **O**bstacle, **S**ky.
- Assume that a lidar sensor (laser telemeter) returns the information $X \in \{T, O\}$, but we there is a probability $p = 0.1$ that the information is not reliable (because, e.g., the sensor is out of order).
- How to represent this information by a mass function?

Formalization



- Here, the probability p is not about X , but about the state of a sensor.
- Let $S = \{\text{working}, \text{broken}\}$ the set of possible sensor states.
 - If the state is “working”, we know that $X \in \{T, O\}$.
 - If the state is “broken”, we just know that $X \in \Omega$, and nothing more.
- This uncertain evidence can be represented by the following mass function m on Ω :

$$m(\{T, O\}) = 0.9, \quad m(\Omega) = 0.1$$

Meaning of a mass function

- In the previous example,
 - $m(\{T, O\}) = 0.9$ is the **probability of knowing only that $X \in \{T, O\}$** , and
 - $m(\Omega) = 0.1$ is the **probability of knowing nothing**.
- In general, what is the meaning (semantics) of a mass function in DS theory?
- A precise interpretation was proposed by Shafer (1981): **random code semantics**.

Random code semantics

- We consider a situation in which we receive a **coded message** containing reliable information about variable $X \in \Omega$.
- The message was encoded using some code in the set $S = \{c_1, \dots, c_n\}$.
- There is a **multi-valued mapping** $\Gamma : S \rightarrow 2^\Omega \setminus \{\emptyset\}$ that defines the meaning of the message: if code c_i was used, then the meaning of the message is “ $X \in \Gamma(c_i)$ ”.
- We don't know which code was used, but we know that each code c_i had a chance p_i of being selected, with $\sum_{i=1}^n p_i = 1$.
- Then $m(A)$ is the **probability that the meaning of the message is “ $X \in A$ ”**:

$$m(A) = P(\{c \in S \mid \Gamma(c) = A\}) = \sum_{i=1}^n p_i I(\Gamma(c_i) = A),$$

where $I(\cdot)$ is the indicator function.

Random code semantics (continued)

- In practice, we do not receive randomly coded messages.
- But we can construct a mass function by **comparing our evidence about some variable X , to a hypothetical situation in which we receive a randomly coded message.**
- A mass function m is elicited by finding the “coded-message” canonical example that is the most similar to our evidence.

Random set

- The tuple $(S, 2^S, P, \Gamma)$, where
 - $(S, 2^S, P)$ is a probability space and
 - Γ is a mapping from S to 2^Ω

is called a **random set**.

- We have seen that, given the random set $(S, 2^S, P, \Gamma)$, we can define the mass function $m : 2^\Omega \rightarrow [0, 1]$ such that

$$m(A) = P(\{c \in S \mid \Gamma(c) = A\})$$

- Conversely, given any mass function $m : 2^\Omega \rightarrow [0, 1]$, we can define the random set $(S, 2^S, P, \Gamma)$ with

$$S = 2^\Omega,$$

$$P(\{A\}) = m(A), \quad A \subseteq \Omega,$$

and

$$\Gamma(A) = A, \quad A \subseteq \Omega.$$

Special mass functions

Definition (Logical mass function)

If a mass function has only one focal set $A \subseteq \Omega$, it is said to be *logical*; we denote it as $m_{[A]}$. It represents “infallible” evidence that tells us that $X \in A$ for sure and nothing more. (There is a one-to-one correspondence between logical mass functions and nonempty sets).

Definition (Vacuous mass function)

The *vacuous* mass function m_τ is the logical mass function such that $m_\tau(\Omega) = 1$. It represents *total ignorance*.

Definition (Bayesian mass function)


A mass function is *Bayesian* if its focal sets are singletons. It is equivalent to a probability distribution.

Outline


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 - **Belief and plausibility functions**
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Certainty and possibility


- Assume our evidence tells us that $X \in A$ for sure and nothing more, for some $A \subseteq \Omega$. It is represented by the **logical mass function** $m_{[A]}$.
- Let $B \subseteq \Omega$. What can we say about the proposition “ $X \in B$ ”?



- If $A \subseteq B$, we know for sure that $X \in B$. This proposition is said to be **certain**. (It is **supported/IMPLIED** by the evidence)



- If $A \cap B \neq \emptyset$, we cannot exclude that $X \in B$. This proposition is said to be **possible**. (It is **consistent** with the evidence)



- If $A \cap B = \emptyset$, the proposition “ $X \in B$ ” is **impossible**. (It is **inconsistent** with the evidence)

Belief function

- Let us now consider an **arbitrary mass function** m with (nonempty) focal sets A_1, \dots, A_n .
- Let $B \subseteq \Omega$. If we know for sure that $X \in A_i$, the proposition $X \in B$ is supported by the evidence whenever $A_i \subseteq B$.
- The probability that the proposition $X \in B$ is supported by the evidence is

$$Bel(B) = \sum_{i=1}^n m(A_i) I(A_i \subseteq B).$$

- The number $Bel(B)$ is called the **credibility** of (degree of belief in) B , and the mapping $Bel : 2^\Omega \rightarrow [0, 1]$ is called the **belief function** induced by m .
- Elementary properties: $Bel(\emptyset) = 0$, $Bel(\Omega) = 1$.

Plausibility function

- We can also compute the probability that the proposition $X \in B$ is consistent with the evidence as

$$Pl(B) = \sum_{i=1}^n m(A_i) I(A_i \cap B \neq \emptyset).$$

- The number $Pl(B)$ is called the **plausibility** of B , and the mapping $Pl : 2^\Omega \rightarrow [0, 1]$ is called the **plausibility function** induced by m .
- Elementary properties:
 - $Pl(\emptyset) = 0$, $Pl(\Omega) = 1$
 - For all $B \subseteq \Omega$, $Bel(B) \leq Pl(B)$
 - For any $A, B \subseteq \Omega$, $(A \cap B = \emptyset \Leftrightarrow A \subseteq \overline{B})$. Consequently,

$$Pl(B) = 1 - Bel(\overline{B}).$$

- Function $pl : \Omega \rightarrow [0, 1]$ such that $pl(\omega) = Pl(\{\omega\})$ is called the **contour function** of m .

Two-dimensional representation

- The uncertainty on a proposition B is represented by two numbers: $Bel(B)$ and $Pl(B)$, with $Bel(B) \leq Pl(B)$.
- The intervals $[Bel(B), Pl(B)]$ have **maximum length** when m is the **vacuous** mass function. Then,

$$[Bel(B), Pl(B)] = [0, 1]$$

for all subset B of Ω , except \emptyset and Ω .

- The intervals $[Bel(B), Pl(B)]$ are reduced to points when m is **Bayesian**. Then,

$$Bel(B) = Pl(B)$$

for all B , and $Bel = Pl$ is a **probability measure**.

Broken sensor example

- From

$$m(A) = 0.9, \quad m(\Omega) = 0.1$$

we get

| | A | \bar{A} | Ω |
|-------|-----|-----------|----------|
| Bel | 0.9 | 0 | 1 |
| Pl | 1 | 0.1 | 1 |

- We observe that

$$Bel(\Omega) = Bel(A \cup \bar{A}) \geq Bel(A) + Bel(\bar{A})$$

and

$$Pl(\Omega) = Pl(A \cup \bar{A}) \leq Pl(A) + Pl(\bar{A})$$

- Bel and Pl are **nonadditive measures**. (Bel is superadditive and Pl is subadditive).

Characterization of belief functions

- Function $Bel : 2^\Omega \rightarrow [0, 1]$ is **completely monotone**: for any $k \geq 2$ and for any family A_1, \dots, A_k in 2^Ω :

$$Bel \left(\bigcup_{i=1}^k A_i \right) \geq \sum_{\emptyset \neq I \subseteq \{1, \dots, k\}} (-1)^{|I|+1} Bel \left(\bigcap_{i \in I} A_i \right).$$

- Conversely, to any completely monotone set function Bel such $Bel(\emptyset) = 0$ and $Bel(\Omega) = 1$ corresponds a unique mass function m such that:

$$m(A) = \sum_{\emptyset \neq B \subseteq A} (-1)^{|A|-|B|} Bel(B), \quad \forall A \subseteq \Omega.$$

Relations between m , Bel and Pl

- Let m be a mass function, Bel and Pl the corresponding belief and plausibility functions.
- For all $A \subseteq \Omega$,

$$Bel(A) = 1 - Pl(\bar{A})$$

$$m(A) = \sum_{\emptyset \neq B \subseteq A} (-1)^{|A|-|B|} Bel(B)$$

$$m(A) = \sum_{B \subseteq A} (-1)^{|A|-|B|+1} Pl(\bar{B})$$

- m , Bel and Pl are thus **three equivalent representations** of a piece of evidence.

Relationship with Possibility theory

- When the focal sets of m are nested: $A_1 \subset A_2 \subset \dots \subset A_r$, m is said to be **consonant**.
- The following relations then hold:

$$PI(A \cup B) = \max(PI(A), PI(B)), \quad \forall A, B \subseteq \Omega.$$

- PI is this a **possibility measure**, and Bel is the dual **necessity measure**.
- The possibility distribution is the **contour function**:

$$pl(x) = PI(\{x\}), \quad \forall x \in \Omega$$

- The theory of belief function can thus be considered as **more expressive** than possibility theory (but the combination operations are different, as we will see later).

Credal set

- A probability measure P on Ω is said to be **compatible** with m if

$$\forall A \subseteq \Omega, \quad Bel(A) \leq P(A) \leq Pl(A)$$

- The set $\mathcal{P}(m)$ of probability measures compatible with m is called the **credal set** of m

$$\mathcal{P}(m) = \{P : \forall A \subseteq \Omega, Bel(A) \leq P(A)\}$$

- Bel is the **lower envelope** of $\mathcal{P}(m)$

$$\forall A \subseteq \Omega, \quad Bel(A) = \min_{P \in \mathcal{P}(m)} P(A)$$

- Not all lower envelopes of sets of probability measures are belief functions!

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Road scene example continued

- Variable X was defined as the type of object in some region of the image, and the frame was $\Omega = \{G, R, T, O, S\}$, corresponding to the possibilities **G**rass, **R**oad, **T**ree/Bush, **O**bstacle, **S**ky
- A lidar sensor gave us the following mass function:


$$m_1(\{T, O\}) = 0.9, \quad m_1(\Omega) = 0.1$$

- Now, assume that a camera returns the mass function:

$$m_2(\{G, T\}) = 0.8, \quad m_2(\Omega) = 0.2$$

- How to combine these two pieces of evidence?

Analysis



- If the two sensors are in states s_1 and s_2 , then $X \in \Gamma_1(s_1) \cap \Gamma_2(s_2)$.
- If the two pieces of evidence are **independent**, then the probability that the sensors are in states s_1 and s_2 is $P_1(\{s_1\})P_2(\{s_2\})$.

Computation

| $m_1 \setminus m_2$ | $\{T, G\}$ (0.8) | Ω (0.2) |
|---------------------|---------------------|-------------------|
| $\{O, T\}$ (0.9) | $\{T\}$ (0.72) | $\{O, T\}$ (0.18) |
| Ω (0.1) | $\{T, G\}$ (0.08) | Ω (0.02) |

We then get the following combined mass function:


$$m(\{T\}) = 0.72$$

$$m(\{O, T\}) = 0.18$$

$$m(\{T, G\}) = 0.08$$

$$m(\Omega) = 0.02$$

Case of conflicting pieces of evidence



- If $\Gamma_1(s_1) \cap \Gamma_2(s_2) = \emptyset$, we know that the pair of states (s_1, s_2) cannot have occurred.
- The joint probability distribution on $S_1 \times S_2$ must be conditioned to eliminate such pairs.

Computation

| $m_1 \setminus m_2$ | $\{G, R\}$ (0.8) | Ω (0.2) |
|---------------------|---------------------|-------------------|
| $\{O, T\}$ (0.9) | \emptyset (0.72) | $\{O, T\}$ (0.18) |
| Ω (0.1) | $\{G, R\}$ (0.08) | Ω (0.02) |

We then get the following combined mass function,

$$m(\emptyset) = 0$$

$$m(\{O, T\}) = 0.18/0.28 = 9/14$$

$$m(\{G, R\}) = 0.08/0.28 = 4/14$$

$$m(\Omega) = 0.02/0.28 = 1/14$$

Dempster's rule

- The orthogonal sum of two mass functions m_1 and m_2 on Ω is the mass function $m_1 \oplus m_2$ defined as $(m_1 \oplus m_2)(\emptyset) = 0$ and

$$(m_1 \oplus m_2)(A) = \frac{1}{1 - \kappa} \sum_{B \cap C = A} m_1(B)m_2(C), \quad \forall A \neq \emptyset,$$

where

$$\kappa = \sum_{B \cap C = \emptyset} m_1(B)m_2(C)$$

is the **degree of conflict** between m_1 and m_2 .

- If $\kappa = 1$, m_1 and m_2 are not combinable.

Properties of Dempster's rule

- Commutativity, associativity. Neutral element: $m_?$
- Generalization of **intersection**: if $m_{[A]}$ and $m_{[B]}$ are logical mass functions and $A \cap B \neq \emptyset$, then

$$m_{[A]} \oplus m_{[B]} = m_{[A \cap B]}$$

- If either m_1 or m_2 is Bayesian, then so is $m_1 \oplus m_2$ (as the intersection of a singleton with another subset is either a singleton, or the empty set).

Dempster's conditioning

- Conditioning is a special case, where a mass function m is combined with a logical mass function $m_{[A]}$. Notation:

$$m \oplus m_{[A]} = m(\cdot | A)$$

- It can be shown that

$$PI(B | A) = \frac{PI(A \cap B)}{PI(A)}.$$

- Generalization of **Bayes' conditioning**: if m is a Bayesian mass function and $m_{[A]}$ is a logical mass function, then $m \oplus m_{[A]}$ is a Bayesian mass function corresponding to the conditioning of m by A .

Commonality function

- **Commonality function:** let $Q : 2^\Omega \rightarrow [0, 1]$ be defined as

$$Q(A) = \sum_{B \supseteq A} m(B), \quad \forall A \subseteq \Omega$$

- Conversely,

$$m(A) = \sum_{B \supseteq A} (-1)^{|B \setminus A|} Q(B)$$

- Q is another equivalent representation of a belief function.

Commonality function and Dempster's rule

- Let Q_1 and Q_2 be the commonality functions associated to m_1 and m_2 .
- Let $Q_1 \oplus Q_2$ be the commonality function associated to $m_1 \oplus m_2$.
- We have

$$(Q_1 \oplus Q_2)(A) = \frac{1}{1 - \kappa} Q_1(A) \cdot Q_2(A), \quad \forall A \subseteq \Omega, A \neq \emptyset$$

$$(Q_1 \oplus Q_2)(\emptyset) = 1$$

- In particular, $pI(\omega) = Q(\{\omega\})$. Consequently,

$$pI_1 \oplus pI_2 = (1 - \kappa)^{-1} pI_1 pI_2.$$

Remarks on normalization

- Mass functions expressing pieces of evidence are always normalized.
- Smets introduced the **unnormalized Dempster's rule** (TBM conjunctive rule \oplus), which may yield an unnormalized mass function.
- He proposed to interpret $m(\emptyset)$ as the mass committed to the hypothesis that X might not take its value in Ω (**open-world assumption**).
- I now think that this interpretation is problematic, as $m(\emptyset)$ increases “mechanically” when combining more and more items of evidence.
- Claim: unnormalized mass functions are convenient mathematically as equivalent representations of normalized mass functions, but **only normalized mass functions make sense**.
- In particular, Bel and Pl should always be computed from normalized mass functions.

TBM disjunctive rule

- Let m_1 and m_2 be two mass functions induced by random messages (S_1, P_1, Γ_1) and (S_2, P_2, Γ_2) .
- Previously, we have assumed that **both messages were reliable**, i.e., if the true codes are $c_1 \in S_1$ and $c_2 \in S_2$, we can conclude that $X \in \Gamma_1(c_1) \cap \Gamma_2(c_2)$ for sure.
- We can weaken this assumption by supposing only that **at least one of the two messages is reliable**, i.e., if the true codes are $c_1 \in S_1$ and $c_2 \in S_2$, we can only conclude that $X \in \Gamma_1(c_1) \cup \Gamma_2(c_2)$ for sure.
- This leads to the **TBM disjunctive rule**:

$$(m_1 \circledast m_2)(A) = \sum_{B \cup C = A} m_1(B) m_2(C), \quad \forall A \subseteq \Omega$$

- $Bel_1 \circledast Bel_2 = Bel_1 \cdot Bel_2$

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Informational comparison of belief functions

- Let m_1 and m_2 be two mass functions on Ω
- In what sense can we say that m_1 is **more informative (committed)** than m_2 ?
- Special case:
 - Let $m_{[A]}$ and $m_{[B]}$ be two logical mass functions
 - $m_{[A]}$ is more committed than $m_{[B]}$ iff $A \subseteq B$
- Extension to arbitrary mass functions?

Plausibility ordering

Definition

m_1 is *pl-more committed* than m_2 (noted $m_1 \sqsubseteq_{pl} m_2$) if

$$Pl_1(A) \leq Pl_2(A), \quad \forall A \subseteq \Omega$$

or, equivalently,

$$Bel_1(A) \geq Bel_2(A), \quad \forall A \subseteq \Omega.$$

- Imprecise probability interpretation:

$$m_1 \sqsubseteq_{pl} m_2 \Leftrightarrow \mathcal{P}(m_1) \subseteq \mathcal{P}(m_2)$$

- Properties:

- Extension of set inclusion:

$$m_{[A]} \sqsubseteq_{pl} m_{[B]} \Leftrightarrow A \subseteq B$$

- Greatest element: vacuous mass function $m_?$

Commonality ordering

- If $m_1 = m \oplus m_2$ for some m , and if there is no conflict between m and m_2 , then $Q_1(A) = Q(A)Q_2(A) \leq Q_2(A)$ for all $A \subseteq \Omega$
- This property suggests that smaller values of the commonality function are associated with richer information content of the mass function

Definition

m_1 is *q-more committed* than m_2 (noted $m_1 \sqsubseteq_q m_2$) if

$$Q_1(A) \leq Q_2(A), \quad \forall A \subseteq \Omega$$

Properties:

- Extension of set inclusion:

$$m_{[A]} \sqsubseteq_q m_{[B]} \Leftrightarrow A \subseteq B$$

- Greatest element: vacuous mass function $m_?$

Strong (specialization) ordering

Definition

m_1 is a *specialization* of m_2 (noted $m_1 \sqsubseteq_s m_2$) if m_1 can be obtained from m_2 by distributing each mass $m_2(B)$ to subsets of B :

$$m_1(A) = \sum_{B \subseteq \Omega} S(A, B) m_2(B), \quad \forall A \subseteq \Omega,$$

where $S(A, B) =$ proportion of $m_2(B)$ transferred to $A \subseteq B$.

- S : specialization matrix
- Properties:
 - Extension of set inclusion
 - Greatest element: $m_?$
 - $m_1 \sqsubseteq_s m_2 \Rightarrow \begin{cases} m_1 \sqsubseteq_{pl} m_2 \\ m_1 \sqsubseteq_q m_2 \end{cases}$

Least Commitment Principle

Definition (Least Commitment Principle)

*When several belief functions are compatible with a set of constraints, **the least informative** according to some informational ordering (if it exists) should be selected*

A very powerful method for constructing belief functions!

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Motivations

- The basic rules \oplus and \cup assume the sources of information to be **independent**, e.g.
 - experts with non overlapping experience/knowledge
 - non overlapping datasets
- What to do in case of **non independent evidence**?
 - Describe the nature of the interaction between sources (difficult, requires a lot of information)
 - Use a combination rule that **tolerates redundancy** in the combined information
- Such rules can be derived from the LCP using **suitable informational orderings**.

Principle

- Two sources provide mass functions m_1 and m_2 , and the sources are both considered to be reliable.
- After receiving these m_1 and m_2 , the agent's state of belief should be represented by a mass function m_{12} **more committed than m_1 , and more committed than m_2 .**
- Let $\mathcal{S}_x(m)$ be the set of mass functions m' such that $m' \sqsubseteq_x m$, for some $x \in \{p, l, q, s, \dots\}$. We thus impose that

$$m_{12} \in \mathcal{S}_x(m_1) \cap \mathcal{S}_x(m_2).$$

- According to the LCP, we should select the **x -least committed element** in $\mathcal{S}_x(m_1) \cap \mathcal{S}_x(m_2)$, **if it exists.**

Cautious rule

Problem

- The above approach works for special cases.
- Example (Dubois, Prade, Smets 2001): if m_1 and m_2 are consonant, then the q -least committed element in $S_q(m_1) \cap S_q(m_2)$ exists and it is unique: it is the consonant mass function with commonality function $Q_{12} = \min(Q_1, Q_2)$.
- In general, neither existence nor uniqueness of a solution can be guaranteed with any of the x -orderings, $x \in \{p, q, s\}$.
- We need to define a **new ordering relation**.

Simple mass functions

- Definition: m is **simple mass function** if it has the following form

$$m(A) = 1 - \delta(A)$$

$$m(\Omega) = \delta(A)$$

for some $A \subset \Omega$, $A \neq \emptyset$ and $\delta(A) \in (0, 1]$.

- The quantity $w(A) = -\ln \delta(A) \geq 0$ is called the **weight of evidence** for A . Mass function m is denoted by $A^{w(A)}$.
- Property:

$$A^{w_1(A)} \oplus A^{w_2(A)} = A^{w_1(A)+w_2(A)}.$$

- Remark: In earlier work, following Smets' terminology, I used the term "weight" for $\delta(A)$. I now think it is better to reserve the term "weight" for additive quantities. In recent work, Faux and Dubois use the term "**diffidence**" for $\delta(A)$.

Separable mass functions

Definition (Separable mass function)

A (normalized) mass function is *separable* if it can be written as the \oplus combination of simple mass functions:

$$m = \bigoplus_{\emptyset \neq A \subset \Omega} A^{w(A)}$$

with $w(A) \geq 0$ for all $A \subset \Omega$, $A \neq \emptyset$.

The w -ordering

Definition

Let m_1 and m_2 be two mass functions. We say that m_1 is *w-more committed* than m_2 (denoted by $m_1 \sqsubseteq_w m_2$) if

$$m_1 = m_2 \oplus m.$$

for some *separable* mass function m .

How to check this condition?

Weight function

- If m is separable, the corresponding weights of evidence can be obtained as

$$w(A) = \sum_{B \supseteq A} (-1)^{|B|-|A|} \ln Q(B) \quad (1)$$

for all $A \subseteq \Omega$.

- For any **non dogmatic** mass function m , (i.e., such that $m(\Omega) > 0$), we can still define “weights” from (1), but we can have $w(A) < 0$.
- Function w is called the **weight function**.
- m can also be recovered from w by

$$m = \bigoplus_{\emptyset \neq A \subseteq \Omega} A^{w(A)},$$

although $A^{w(A)}$ is not a proper mass function when $w(A) < 0$.

Properties of the weight function

- m is separable iff

$$w(A) \geq 0, \quad \forall A \subset \Omega, A \neq \emptyset.$$

- Dempster's rule can be computed using the w -function by

$$m_1 \oplus m_2 = \bigoplus_{\emptyset \neq A \subset \Omega} A^{w_1(A)+w_2(A)}.$$

- Characterization of the w -ordering

$$m_1 \sqsubseteq_w m_2 \Leftrightarrow w_1(A) \geq w_2(A), \quad \forall A \subset \Omega, A \neq \emptyset.$$

Cautious rule

Definition

Let m_1 and m_2 be two non dogmatic mass functions with weight functions w_1 and w_2 .

Proposition

The w -least committed element in $S_w(m_1) \cap S_w(m_2)$ exists and is unique. It is defined by:

$$m_1 \textcircled{\wedge} m_2 = \bigoplus_{\emptyset \neq A \subset \Omega} A^{\max(w_1(A), w_2(A))}.$$

Operator $\textcircled{\wedge}$ is called the (normalized) cautious rule.

Computation

Cautious rule computation

| m -space | | w -space |
|------------------------|-------------------|------------------|
| m_1 | \longrightarrow | w_1 |
| m_2 | \longrightarrow | w_2 |
| $m_1 \hat{\wedge} m_2$ | \longleftarrow | $\max(w_1, w_2)$ |

Remark: we often have simple mass functions in the first place, so that the w function is readily available.

Properties of the cautious rule

- Commutative, associative
- **Idempotent** : $\forall m, m \textcircled{\wedge} m = m$
- Distributivity of \oplus with respect to $\textcircled{\wedge}$

$$(m_1 \oplus m_2) \textcircled{\wedge} (m_1 \oplus m_3) = m_1 \oplus (m_2 \textcircled{\wedge} m_3), \forall m_1, m_2, m_3$$

The common item of evidence m_1 is not counted twice!

- No neutral element, but $m_? \textcircled{\wedge} m = m$ iff m is separable

Basic rules

| Sources | independent | dependent |
|-----------------------|-------------|-------------|
| All reliable | \oplus | \bigwedge |
| At least one reliable | \bigcup | \bigvee |

\bigvee is the bold disjunctive rule

Outline

- 1 Basic notions
 - Mass functions
 - Belief and plausibility functions
 - Dempster's rule

- 2 Selected advanced topics
 - Informational orderings
 - Cautious rule
 - Compatible frames

Refinement and coarsening

Example


- Let us come back to the road scene analysis example, with $\Omega = \{G, R, T, O, S\}$.
- Assume that we have a **vegetation** detector, which can determine if a region of the image contains vegetation or not. For this detector, the frame of discernment is $\Theta = \{V, \neg V\}$, where V means that there is vegetation, and $\neg V$ means that there is no vegetation.
- We have the correspondence

$$\begin{aligned} V &\rightarrow \{G, T\} \\ \neg V &\rightarrow \{R, O, S\} \end{aligned}$$

- The elements of Ω can be obtained by splitting some or all of the elements of Θ . We say that Ω is a **refinement** of Θ , and Θ is a **coarsening** of Ω

Refinement and coarsening

General definition



Definition

A frame Ω is a **refinement** of a frame Θ iff there is a mapping $\rho : 2^\Theta \rightarrow 2^\Omega$ (called a **refining**) such that:

- $\{\rho(\{\theta\}), \theta \in \Theta\} \subseteq 2^\Omega$ is a partition of Ω , and
- For all $A \subseteq \Omega$, $\rho(A) = \bigcup_{\theta \in A} \rho(\{\theta\})$.

Vacuous extension

- In the road scene example, assume that the vegetation detector provides the following mass function on Θ :

$$m^\Theta(\{V\}) = 0.6, \quad m^\Theta(\{\neg V\}) = 0.3, \quad m^\Theta(\Theta) = 0.1$$

- How to express m^Θ in Ω ?
- Solution: for all $A \subseteq \Theta$, we transfer the mass $m^\Theta(A)$ to $\rho(A)$. Here,

$$\begin{aligned} m^\Theta(\{V\}) = 0.6 &\rightarrow \rho(\{V\}) = \{G, T\} \\ m^\Theta(\{\neg V\}) = 0.3 &\rightarrow \rho(\{\neg V\}) = \{R, O, S\} \\ m^\Theta(\Theta) = 0.1 &\rightarrow \rho(\Theta) = \Omega \end{aligned}$$

- We finally get the following mass function on Ω ,

$$m^{\Theta \uparrow \Omega}(\{G, T\}) = 0.6, \quad m^{\Theta \uparrow \Omega}(\{R, O, S\}) = 0.3, \quad m^{\Theta \uparrow \Omega}(\Omega) = 0.1.$$

- $m^{\Theta \uparrow \Omega}$ is called the **vacuous extension** of m^Θ in Ω .


Expression of information in a coarser frame

- Let us now assume that we have the following mass function on Ω ,

$$m^\Omega(\{T\}) = 0.4, \quad m^\Omega(\{T, O\}) = 0.3, \quad m^\Omega(\{R, S\}) = 0.3.$$

- How to express m^Ω in Θ ?
- We cannot do it without loss of information, because, for instance, there is no $A \subseteq \Theta$ such that $\rho(A) = \{T\}$: the mapping ρ does not have an inverse.

Inner and outer reductions



- We can approximate any subset B of Ω by two subsets in Θ :
 - The **inner reduction** of B :

$$\underline{\rho}^{-1}(B) = \{\theta \in \Theta \mid \rho(\{\theta\}) \subseteq B\}$$

- The **outer reduction** of B :

$$\bar{\rho}^{-1}(B) = \{\theta \in \Theta \mid \rho(\{\theta\}) \cap B \neq \emptyset\}.$$

- In the example:

$$\underline{\rho}^{-1}(\{T\}) = \underline{\rho}^{-1}(\{T, O\}) = \underline{\rho}^{-1}(\{R, S\}) = \emptyset$$

$$\bar{\rho}^{-1}(\{T\}) = \{V\}, \quad \bar{\rho}^{-1}(\{T, O\}) = \{V, \neg V\}, \quad \bar{\rho}^{-1}(\{R, S\}) = \{\neg V\}$$

Restriction

Definition

The *restriction* of m^Ω in Θ is obtained by transferring each mass $m^\Omega(B)$ to the *outer reduction* of B : for all subset A of Θ ,

$$m^{\Omega \downarrow \Theta}(A) = \sum_{\bar{\rho}^{-1}(B)=A} m^\Omega(B).$$

- In the example, we thus have

$$m^{\Omega \downarrow \Theta}(\{V\}) = 0.4, \quad m^{\Omega \downarrow \Theta}(\Theta) = 0.3, \quad m^{\Omega \downarrow \Theta}(\{\neg V\}) = 0.3.$$

- Remark: the vacuous extension of $m^{\Omega \downarrow \Theta}$ is

$$m^{(\Omega \downarrow \Theta) \uparrow \Omega}(\{G, T\}) = 0.4, \quad m^{(\Omega \downarrow \Theta) \uparrow \Omega}(\Omega) = 0.3,$$

$$m^{(\Omega \downarrow \Theta) \uparrow \Omega}(\{R, S, O\}) = 0.3.$$


It is less precise that m^Ω : **we have lost information** when expressing m^Ω in a coarser frame.

Compatible frames of discernment

Definition

Two frames are *compatible* if they have a common refinement.

Example:



Combination of mass functions on compatible frames

- Let m^{Θ_1} and m^{Θ_2} be two mass functions defined on compatible frames Θ_1 and Θ_2 with common refinement Ω .
- The orthogonal sum of m^{Θ_1} and m^{Θ_2} in Ω is


$$m^{\Theta_1} \oplus m^{\Theta_2} = m^{\Theta_1 \uparrow \Omega} \oplus m^{\Theta_2 \uparrow \Omega}$$

- Example: assume that $m^{\Theta_1}(\{V\}) = 0.3$, $m^{\Theta_1}(\{\neg V\}) = 0.5$, $m^{\Theta_1}(\{V, \neg V\}) = 0.2$, and $m^{\Theta_2}(\{Gr\}) = 0.4$, $m^{\Theta_2}(\{\neg Gr\}) = 0.5$, $m^{\Theta_2}(\{Gr, \neg Gr\}) = 0.1$. Compute $m^{\Theta_1} \oplus m^{\Theta_2}$.

Case of product frames

Cylindrical extension

- Let us now assume that we have two frames Ω_X and Ω_Y related to two **different questions** about, e.g., the values of two unknown variables X and Y .
- Let $\Omega_{XY} = \Omega_X \times \Omega_Y$ be the product space. It is a refinement of both Ω_X and Ω_Y .




- We can define the following refining ρ from 2^{Ω_X} to $2^{\Omega_{XY}}$:

$$\rho(A) = A \times \Omega_Y,$$

for all $A \subseteq \Omega_X$. The set $\rho(A)$ is called the **cylindrical extension** of A in Ω_{XY} and is denoted by $A \uparrow \Omega_{XY}$.

Case of product frames

Projection



- Conversely, let R be a subset of Ω_{XY} .
- Its outer reduction is

$$\begin{aligned}\bar{\rho}^{-1}(R) &= \{x \in \Omega_X \mid \rho(\{x\}) \cap R \neq \emptyset\} \\ &= \{x \in \Omega_X \mid \exists y \in \Omega_Y, (x, y) \in R\}.\end{aligned}$$

- This set is denoted by $R \downarrow \Omega_X$ and is called the **projection** of R on Ω_X

Case of product frames

Vacuous extension and marginalization

- The **vacuous extension** of a mass function m^X from Ω_X to Ω_{XY} is obtained by transferring each mass $m^X(B)$ for any subset B of Ω_X to the cylindrical extension of B :

$$m^{X \uparrow XY}(A) = \begin{cases} m^X(B) & \text{if } A = B \times \Omega_Y \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

- Conversely, the **restriction** of a joint mass function m^{XY} on Ω_{XY} is

$$m^{XY \downarrow X}(A) = \sum_{B \downarrow \Omega_X = A} m^{XY}(B),$$

for all $A \subseteq \Omega_X$. The mass functions $m^{XY \downarrow X}$ and $m^{XY \downarrow Y}$ are called the **marginals** of m^{XY} and the operation that computes the marginals from a joint mass function is called **marginalization**. This operation extends both set projection and probabilistic marginalization.

Application to approximate reasoning

- Assume that we have:
 - Partial knowledge of X formalized as a mass function m^X
 - A joint mass function m^{XY} representing an uncertain relation between X and Y

● What can we say about Y ?


● Solution:

$$m^Y = (m^{X \uparrow XY} \oplus m^{XY}) \downarrow^Y .$$

- Infeasible with many variables and large frames of discernment, but **efficient algorithms** exist to carry out the operations in frames of minimal dimensions.

Example

- A machine fails if any one of two components fails.
- Let Z , X and Y be the binary variables describing the states of the two components, and the machine.



- We have the following prior knowledge about the states of the components:

$$m^X(\{1\}) = 0.1, m^X(\{0\}) = 0.3,$$

$$m^X(\{0, 1\}) = 0.6$$

$$m^Y(\{0, 1\}) = 1$$

- We observe that the machine fails. What are our beliefs about the states of the two components?

Solution

- Pieces of evidence:

$$m_0^{XYZ}(\{(1, 1, 1), (1, 0, 1), (0, 1, 1), (0, 0, 0)\}) = 1$$

$$m^{X\uparrow XYZ}(\{1\} \times \Omega_{YZ}) = 0.1, \quad m^{X\uparrow XYZ}(\{0\} \times \Omega_{YZ}) = 0.3, \quad m^{X\uparrow XYZ}(\Omega_{XYZ}) = 0.6$$

$$m^{Y\uparrow XYZ}(\Omega_{XYZ}) = 1, \quad m^{Z\uparrow XYZ}(\Omega_{XY} \times \{1\}) = 1$$

- Let $m_1^{XYZ} = m_0^{XYZ} \oplus m^{X\uparrow XYZ} \oplus m^{Z\uparrow XYZ}$. We have

$$m_1^{XYZ}(\{(1, 1, 1), (1, 0, 1)\}) = 0.1, \quad m_1^{XYZ}(\{(0, 1, 1)\}) = 0.3,$$

$$m_1^{XYZ}(\{(1, 1, 1), (1, 0, 1), (0, 1, 1)\}) = 0.6$$

- Marginalizing on X and Y , we get

$$m_1^{XYZ\downarrow X}(\{1\}) = 0.1, \quad m_1^{XYZ\downarrow X}(\{0\}) = 0.3, \quad m_1^{XYZ\downarrow X}(\{0, 1\}) = 0.6$$

$$m_1^{XYZ\downarrow Y}(\{1\}) = 0.3, \quad m_1^{XYZ\downarrow Y}(\{0, 1\}) = 0.7$$

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cf. <http://www.hds.utc.fr/~tdenoeux>



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