## Workshop on belief functions

# Lecture 1 - Representation and Combination of Evidence 

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## Topic of this workshop

(1) This workshop is about the theory of belief functions and its applications to Computational Statistics and Econometrics.
(2) What is the Theory of Belief Functions?

- A formal framework for reasoning and making decisions under uncertainty.
- Originates from Arthur Dempster's seminal work on statistical inference with lower and upper probabilities.
- It was then further developed by Glenn Shafer who showed that belief functions can be used as a general framework for representing and reasoning with uncertain information.
- Also known as Evidence theory or Dempster-Shafer theory.
(3) Many applications in computer science (artificial intelligence, information fusion, pattern recognition, etc.).
(9) Recently, there has been a revived interested in its application to Statistical Inference and Computational Statistics (classification, clustering).


## Outline

## (1) Representation of evidence

- Mass functions
- Belief and plausibility functions

2 Relations with alternative theories

- Possibility theory
- Imprecise probabilities
(3) Combination of evidence
- Dempster's rule
- Some other rules
- Marginalization, extension


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## Mass function

Definition

- Let $X$ be a variable taking values in a finite set $\Omega$ (frame of discernment)
- Evidence about $X$ may be represented by a mass function $m: 2^{\Omega} \rightarrow[0,1]$ such that

$$
\sum_{A \subseteq \Omega} m(A)=1
$$

- Every $A$ of $\Omega$ such that $m(A)>0$ is a focal set of $m$
- $m$ is said to be normalized if $m(\emptyset)=0$. This property will be assumed hereafter, unless otherwise specified


## Example: the broken sensor

- Let $X$ be some physical quantity (e.g., a temperature), talking values in $\Omega$.
- A sensor returns a set of values $A \subset \Omega$, for instance, $A=[20,22]$.
- However, the sensor may be broken, in which case the value it returns is completely arbitrary.
- There is a probability $p=0.1$ that the sensor is broken.
- What can we say about $X$ ? How to represent the available information (evidence)?


## Analysis



- Here, the probability $p$ is not about $X$, but about the state of a sensor.
- Let $S=\{$ working, broken $\}$ the set of possible sensor states.
- If the state is "working", we know that $X \in A$.
- If the state is "broken", we just know that $X \in \Omega$, and nothing more.
- This uncertain evidence can be represented by a mass function $m$ on $\Omega$, such that

$$
m(A)=0.9, \quad m(\Omega)=0.1
$$

## Source

- A mass function $m$ on $\Omega$ may be viewed as arising from
- A set $S=\left\{s_{1}, \ldots, s_{r}\right\}$ of states (interpretations)
- A probability measure $P$ on $S$
- A multi-valued mapping $\Gamma: S \rightarrow 2^{\Omega}$
- The four-tuple $\left(S, 2^{S}, P, \Gamma\right)$ is called a source for $m$
- Meaning: under interpretation $s_{i}$, the evidence tells us that $X \in \Gamma\left(s_{i}\right)$, and nothing more. The probability $P\left(\left\{s_{i}\right\}\right)$ is transferred to $A_{i}=\Gamma\left(s_{i}\right)$
- $m(A)$ is the probability of knowing that $X \in A$, and nothing more, given the available evidence


## Special cases

- If the evidence tells us that $X \in A$ for sure and nothing more, for some $A \subseteq \Omega$, then we have a logical mass function $m_{A}$ such that $m_{A}(A)=1$
- $m_{A}$ is equivalent to $A$
- Special case: $m_{\text {? }}$, the vacuous mass function, represents total ignorance
- If each interpretation $s_{i}$ of the evidence points to a single value of $X$, then all focal sets are singletons and $m$ is said to be Bayesian. It is equivalent to a probability distribution
- A Dempster-Shafer mass function can thus be seen as
- a generalized set
- a generalized probability distribution
- Total ignorance is represented by the vacuous mass function $m_{\text {? }}$ such that $m_{?}(\Omega)=1$


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## Degrees of support and consistency

- Let $m$ be a normalized mass function on $\Omega$ induced by a source $\left(S, 2^{S}, P, \Gamma\right)$.
- Let $A$ be a subset of $\Omega$.
- One may ask:
(1) To what extent does the evidence support the proposition $\omega \in A$ ?
(2) To what extent is the evidence consistent with this proposition?



## Belief function

Definition and interpretation

- For any $A \subseteq \Omega$, the probability that the evidence implies (supports) the proposition $X \in A$ is

$$
\operatorname{Be}\left((A)=P(\{s \in S \mid \Gamma(s) \subseteq A\})=\sum_{B \subseteq A} m(B) .\right.
$$



- The function $\mathrm{Bel}: A \rightarrow \operatorname{Bel}(A)$ is called a belief function.


## Plausibility function

- The probability that the evidence is consistent with (does not contradict) the proposition $X \in A$

$$
P I(A)=P(\{s \in S \mid \Gamma(s) \cap A \neq \emptyset\})=\sum_{B \cap A \neq \emptyset} m(B)=1-\operatorname{Bel}(\bar{A})
$$



- The function $P I: A \rightarrow P I(A)$ is called a plausibility function.
- The function $p l: \omega \rightarrow P l(\{\omega\})$ is called a contour function.


## Two-dimensional representation

- The uncertainty about a proposition $A$ is represented by two numbers: $\operatorname{Bel}(A)$ and $P l(A)$, with $\operatorname{Bel}(A) \leq P I(A)$
- The intervals $[\operatorname{Bel}(A), P l(A)]$ have maximum length when $m=m_{?}$ is vacuous: then, $\operatorname{Bel}(A)=0$ for all $A \neq \Omega$, and $P l(A)=1$ for all $A \neq \emptyset$.
- The intervals $[\operatorname{Bel}(A), P I(A)]$ have minimum length when $m$ is Bayesian. Then, $\operatorname{Bel}(A)=P l(A)$ for all $A$, and $B e l$ is a probability measure.


## Broken sensor example

- From

$$
m(A)=0.9, \quad m(\Omega)=0.1
$$

we get

$$
\begin{gathered}
\operatorname{Bel}(A)=m(A)=0.9, \quad P l(A)=m(A)+m(\Omega)=1 \\
\operatorname{Bel}(\bar{A})=0, \quad P l(\bar{A})=m(\Omega)=0.1 \\
\operatorname{Bel}(\Omega)=P I(\Omega)=1
\end{gathered}
$$

- We observe that

$$
\begin{gathered}
\operatorname{Bel}(A \cup \bar{A}) \geq \operatorname{Bel}(A)+\operatorname{Bel}(\bar{A}) \\
P l(A \cup \bar{A}) \leq P I(A)+P l(\bar{A})
\end{gathered}
$$

- Bel and $P l$ are non additive measures.


## Characterization of belief functions

- Function $\mathrm{Bel}: 2^{\Omega} \rightarrow[0,1]$ is a completely monotone capacity: it verifies $\operatorname{Be}(\emptyset)=0, \operatorname{Be}(\Omega)=1$ and

$$
\operatorname{Bel}\left(\bigcup_{i=1}^{k} A_{i}\right) \geq \sum_{\emptyset \neq I \subseteq\{1, \ldots, k\}}(-1)^{|I|+1} B e l\left(\bigcap_{i \in I} A_{i}\right) .
$$

for any $k \geq 2$ and for any family $A_{1}, \ldots, A_{k}$ in $2^{\Omega}$.

- Conversely, to any completely monotone capacity Bel corresponds a unique mass function $m$ such that:

$$
m(A)=\sum_{\emptyset \neq B \subseteq A}(-1)^{|A|-|B|} B e l(B), \quad \forall A \subseteq \Omega .
$$

## Relations between $m, B e l$ et $P /$

- Let $m$ be a mass function, Bel and $P /$ the corresponding belief and plausibility functions
- For all $A \subseteq \Omega$,

$$
\begin{gathered}
B e l(A)=1-P l(\bar{A}) \\
m(A)=\sum_{\emptyset \neq B \subseteq A}(-1)^{|A|-|B|} \operatorname{Bel}(B) \\
m(A)=\sum_{B \subseteq A}(-1)^{|A|-|B|+1} P l(\bar{B})
\end{gathered}
$$

- $m, B e l$ et $P l$ are thus three equivalent representations of
- a piece of evidence or, equivalently
- a state of belief induced by this evidence


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## Consonant belief function

- When the focal sets of $m$ are nested: $A_{1} \subset A_{2} \subset \ldots \subset A_{r}, m$ is said to be consonant
- The following relations then hold, for all $A, B \subseteq \Omega$,

$$
\begin{gathered}
P l(A \cup B)=\max (P l(A), P l(B)) \\
B e l(A \cap B)=\min (B e l(A), B e l(B))
\end{gathered}
$$

- $P /$ is this a possibility measure, and $B e l$ is the dual necessity measure


## Contour function

- The contour function of a belief function Bel is defined by

$$
p l(\omega)=P l(\{\omega\}), \quad \forall \omega \in \Omega
$$

- When Be l is consonant, it can be recovered from its contour function,

$$
P I(A)=\max _{\omega \in A} p l(\omega) .
$$

- The contour function is then a possibility distribution
- The theory of belief function can thus be considered as more expressive than possibility theory


## From the contour function to the mass function

- Let $p /$ be a contour on the frame $\Omega=\left\{\omega_{1}, \ldots, \omega_{n}\right\}$, with elements arranged by decreasing order of plausibility, i.e.,

$$
1=p \prime\left(\omega_{1}\right) \geq p \prime\left(\omega_{2}\right) \geq \ldots \geq p \prime\left(\omega_{n}\right)
$$

and let $A_{i}$ denote the set $\left\{\omega_{1}, \ldots, \omega_{i}\right\}$, for $1 \leq i \leq n$.

- Then, the corresponding mass function $m$ is

$$
\begin{aligned}
m\left(A_{i}\right) & =p l\left(\omega_{i}\right)-p l\left(\omega_{i+1}\right), \quad 1 \leq i \leq n-1, \\
m(\Omega) & =p l\left(\omega_{n}\right) .
\end{aligned}
$$

## Example

- Consider, for instance, the following contour distribution defined on the frame $\Omega=\{a, b, c, d\}$ :

| $\omega$ | $a$ | $b$ | $c$ | $d$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $p /(\omega)$ | 0.3 | 0.5 | 1 | 0.7 |

- The corresponding mass function is

$$
\begin{aligned}
m(\{c\}) & =1-0.7=0.3 \\
m(\{c, d\}) & =0.7-0.5=0.2 \\
m(\{c, d, b\}) & =0.5-0.3=0.2 \\
m(\{c, d, b, a\}) & =0.3
\end{aligned}
$$

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## Credal set

- A probability measure $P$ on $\Omega$ is said to be compatible with $B e /$ if

$$
\operatorname{Bel}(A) \leq P(A)
$$

for all $A \subseteq \Omega$

- Equivalently, $P(A) \leq P I(A)$ for all $A \subseteq \Omega$
- The set $\mathcal{P}(B e l)$ of probability measures compatible with $B e l$ is called the credal set of Bel

$$
\mathcal{P}(B e l)=\{P: \forall A \subseteq \Omega, B e l(A) \leq P(A)\}
$$

## Construction of $\mathcal{P}(\mathrm{Be} /)$

- An arbitrary element of $\mathcal{P}(\mathrm{Bel})$ can be obtained by distributing each mass $m(A)$ among the elements of $A$.
- More precisely, let $\alpha(\omega, \boldsymbol{A})$ be the fraction of $m(\boldsymbol{A})$ allocated to the element $\omega$. (Function $\alpha$ is called an allocation of probability.) We have

$$
\sum_{\omega \in A} \alpha(\omega, A)=m(A)
$$

- By summing up the numbers $\alpha(\omega, \boldsymbol{A})$ for each $\omega$, we get a probability mass function on $\Omega$,

$$
p_{\alpha}(\omega)=\sum_{A \ni \omega} \alpha(\omega, \boldsymbol{A}) .
$$

- It can be verified that

$$
P_{\alpha}(A)=\sum_{\omega \in A} p_{\alpha}(\omega) \geq \operatorname{Be} /(A)
$$

for all $A \subseteq \Omega$.

## Belief functions are coherent lower probabilities

- It can be shown (Dempster, 1967) that any element of the credal set $\mathcal{P}(\mathrm{Be})$ can be obtained in that way.
- Furthermore, the bounds in the inequalities $\operatorname{Bel}(A) \leq P(A)$ and $P(A) \leq P I(A)$ are attained. We thus have, for all $A \subseteq \Omega$,

$$
\begin{aligned}
B e l(A) & =\min _{P \in \mathcal{P}(B e l)} P(A) \\
P l(A) & =\max _{P \in \mathcal{P}(B e l)} P(A)
\end{aligned}
$$

- We say that $B e l$ is a coherent lower probability.
- Not all lower envelopes of sets of probability measures are belief functions!


## A counterexample

- Suppose a fair coin is tossed twice, in such a way that the outcome of the second toss may depend on the outcome of the first toss.
- The outcome of the experiment can be denoted by $\Omega=\{(H, H),(H, T),(T, H),(T, T)\}$.
- Let $H_{1}=\{(H, H),(H, T)\}$ and $H_{2}=\{(H, H),(T, H)\}$ the events that we get Heads in the first and second toss, respectively.
- Let $\mathcal{P}$ be the set of probability measures on $\Omega$ which assign $P\left(H_{1}\right)=P\left(H_{2}\right)=1 / 2$ and have an arbitrary degree of dependence between tosses.
- Let $P_{*}$ be the lower envelope of $\mathcal{P}$.


## A counterexample - continued

- It is clear that $P_{*}\left(H_{1}\right)=1 / 2, P_{*}\left(H_{2}\right)=1 / 2$ and $P_{*}\left(H_{1} \cap H_{2}\right)=0$ (as the occurrence Heads in the first toss may never lead to getting Heads in the second toss).
- Now, in the case of complete positive dependence, $P\left(H_{1} \cup H_{2}\right)=P\left(H_{1}\right)=1 / 2$, hence $P_{*}\left(H_{1} \cup H_{2}\right) \leq 1 / 2$.
- We thus have

$$
P_{*}\left(H_{1} \cup H_{2}\right)<P_{*}\left(H_{1}\right)+P_{*}\left(H_{2}\right)-P_{*}\left(H_{1} \cap H_{2}\right),
$$

which violates the complete monotonicity condition for $k=2$.

## Two different theories

- Mathematically, the notion of coherent lower probability is thus more general than that of belief function.
- However, the definition of the credal set associated with a belief function is purely formal, as these probabilities have no particular interpretation in our framework.
- The theory of belief functions is not a theory of imprecise probabilities.


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## Broken sensor example continued

- The first item of evidence gave us: $m_{1}(A)=0.9, m_{1}(\Omega)=0.1$.
- Another sensor returns another set of values $B$, and it is in working condition with probability 0.8 .
- This second piece if evidence can be represented by the mass function: $m_{2}(B)=0.8, m_{2}(\Omega)=0.2$
- How to combine these two pieces of evidence?


## Analysis



- If interpretations $s_{1} \in S_{1}$ and $s_{2} \in S_{2}$ both hold, then $X \in \Gamma_{1}\left(s_{1}\right) \cap \Gamma_{2}\left(s_{2}\right)$
- If the two pieces of evidence are independent, then the probability that $s_{1}$ and $s_{2}$ both hold is $P_{1}\left(\left\{s_{1}\right\}\right) P_{2}\left(\left\{s_{2}\right\}\right)$


## Computation

|  | $S_{2}$ working <br> $(0.8)$ | $S_{2}$ broken <br> $(0.2)$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $S_{1}$ working (0.9) | $A \cap B, 0.72$ | $A, 0.18$ |
| $S_{1}$ broken $(0.1)$ | $B, 0.08$ | $\Omega, 0.02$ |

We then get the following combined mass function,

$$
\begin{aligned}
m(A \cap B) & =0.72 \\
m(A) & =0.18 \\
m(B) & =0.08 \\
m(\Omega) & =0.02
\end{aligned}
$$

## Case of conflicting pieces of evidence



- If $\Gamma_{1}\left(s_{1}\right) \cap \Gamma_{2}\left(s_{2}\right)=\emptyset$, we know that $s_{1}$ and $s_{2}$ cannot hold simultaneously
- The joint probability distribution on $S_{1} \times S_{2}$ must be conditioned to eliminate such pairs


## Computation

|  | $S_{2}$ working <br> $(0.8)$ | $S_{2}$ broken <br> $(0.2)$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $S_{1}$ working (0.9) | $\emptyset, 0.72$ | $A, 0.18$ |
| $S_{1}$ broken $(0.1)$ | $B, 0.08$ | $\Omega, 0.02$ |

We then get the following combined mass function,

$$
\begin{aligned}
& m(\emptyset)=0 \\
& m(A)=0.18 / 0.28 \approx 0.64 \\
& m(B)=0.08 / 0.28 \approx 0.29 \\
& m(\Omega)=0.02 / 0.28 \approx 0.07
\end{aligned}
$$

## Dempster's rule

- Let $m_{1}$ and $m_{2}$ be two mass functions and

$$
\kappa=\sum_{B \cap C=\emptyset} m_{1}(B) m_{2}(C)
$$

their degree of conflict

- If $\kappa<1$, then $m_{1}$ and $m_{2}$ can be combined as

$$
\left(m_{1} \oplus m_{2}\right)(A)=\frac{1}{1-\kappa} \sum_{B \cap C=A} m_{1}(B) m_{2}(C), \quad \forall A \neq \emptyset
$$

and $\left(m_{1} \oplus m_{2}\right)(\emptyset)=0$

## Another example

| $A$ | $\emptyset$ | $\{a\}$ | $\{b\}$ | $\{a, b\}$ | $\{c\}$ | $\{a, c\}$ | $\{b, c\}$ | $\{a, b, c\}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $m_{1}(A)$ | 0 | 0 | 0.5 | 0.2 | 0 | 0.3 | 0 | 0 |
| $m_{2}(A)$ | 0 | 0.1 | 0 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0 | 0 | 0 |


|  |  | $m_{2}$ |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | $\{a\}, 0.1$ | $\{a, b\}, 0.4$ | $\{c\}, 0.5$ |
| $m_{1}$ | $\{b\}, 0.5$ | $\emptyset, 0.05$ | $\{b\}, 0.2$ | $\emptyset, 0.25$ |
|  | $\{a, 0.2$ | $\{a\}, 0.02$ | $\{a, b\}, 0.08$ | $\emptyset, 0.1$ |
|  | $\{a, c\}, 0.3$ | $\{a\}, 0.03$ | $\{a\}, 0.12$ | $\{c\}, 0.15$ |

The degree of conflict is $\kappa=0.05+0.25+0.1=0.4$. The combined mass function is

$$
\begin{aligned}
\left(m_{1} \oplus m_{2}\right)(\{a\}) & =(0.02+0.03+0.12) / 0.6=0.17 / 0.6 \\
\left(m_{1} \oplus m_{2}\right)(\{b\}) & =0.2 / 0.6 \\
\left(m_{1} \oplus m_{2}\right)(\{a, b\}) & =0.08 / 0.6 \\
\left(m_{1} \oplus m_{2}\right)(\{c\}) & =0.15 / 0.6 .
\end{aligned}
$$

## Dempster's rule

Properties

- Commutativity, associativity. Neutral element: $m_{\text {? }}$
- Generalization of intersection: if $m_{A}$ and $m_{B}$ are logical mass functions and $A \cap B \neq \emptyset$, then

$$
m_{A} \oplus m_{B}=m_{A \cap B}
$$

- If either $m_{1}$ or $m_{2}$ is Bayesian, then so is $m_{1} \oplus m_{2}$ (as the intersection of a singleton with another subset is either a singleton, or the empty set).


## Dempster's conditioning

- Conditioning is a special case, where a mass function $m$ is combined with a logical mass function $m_{A}$. Notation:

$$
m \oplus m_{A}=m(\cdot \mid A)
$$

- It can be shown that

$$
P I(B \mid A)=\frac{P I(A \cap B)}{P I(A)} .
$$

- Generalization of Bayes' conditioning: if $m$ is a Bayesian mass function and $m_{A}$ is a logical mass function, then $m \oplus m_{A}$ is a Bayesian mass function corresponding to the conditioning of $m$ by $A$


## Commonality function

- Commonality function: let $Q$ : $2^{\Omega} \rightarrow[0,1]$ be defined as

$$
Q(A)=\sum_{B \supseteq A} m(B), \quad \forall A \subseteq \Omega
$$

- Conversely,

$$
m(A)=\sum_{B \supseteq A}(-1)^{|B \backslash A|} Q(B)
$$

- $Q$ is another equivalent representation of a belief function.


## Commonality function and Dempster's rule

- Let $Q_{1}$ and $Q_{2}$ be the commonality functions associated to $m_{1}$ and $m_{2}$.
- Let $Q_{1} \oplus Q_{2}$ be the commonality function associated to $m_{1} \oplus m_{2}$.
- We have

$$
\begin{gathered}
\left(Q_{1} \oplus Q_{2}\right)(A)=\frac{1}{1-\kappa} Q_{1}(A) \cdot Q_{2}(A), \quad \forall A \subseteq \Omega, A \neq \emptyset \\
\left(Q_{1} \oplus Q_{2}\right)(\emptyset)=1
\end{gathered}
$$

- In particular, $p l(\omega)=Q(\{\omega\})$. Consequently,

$$
p l_{1} \oplus p l_{2} \propto(1-\kappa)^{-1} p l_{1} p l_{2} .
$$

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## Disjunctive rule

Definition and justification

- Let $\left(S_{1}, P_{1}, \Gamma_{1}\right)$ and $\left(S_{2}, P_{2}, \Gamma_{2}\right)$ be sources associated to two pieces of evidence
- If interpretation $s_{k} \in S_{k}$ holds and piece of evidence $k$ is reliable, then we can conclude that $X \in \Gamma_{k}\left(s_{k}\right)$
- If interpretation $s \in S_{1}$ and $s_{2} \in S_{2}$ both hold and we assume that at least one of the two pieces of evidence is reliable, then we can conclude that $X \in \Gamma_{1}\left(s_{1}\right) \cup \Gamma_{2}\left(s_{2}\right)$
- This leads to the TBM disjunctive rule:

$$
\left(m_{1} \cup m_{2}\right)(A)=\sum_{B \cup C=A} m_{1}(B) m_{2}(C), \quad \forall A \subseteq \Omega
$$

## Disjunctive rule

## Example

| $A$ | $\emptyset$ | $\{a\}$ | $\{b\}$ | $\{a, b\}$ | $\{c\}$ | $\{a, c\}$ | $\{b, c\}$ | $\{a, b, c\}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $m_{1}(A)$ | 0 | 0 | 0.5 | 0.2 | 0 | 0.3 | 0 | 0 |
| $m_{2}(A)$ | 0 | 0.1 | 0 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0 | 0 | 0 |


|  |  | $m_{2}$ |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | $\{a\}, 0.1$ | $\{a, b\}, 0.4$ | $\{c\}, 0.5$ |
| $m_{1}$ | $\{b\}, 0.5$ | $\{a, b\}, 0.05$ | $\{a, b\}, 0.2$ | $\{b, c\}, 0.25$ |
|  | $\{a, c\}, 0.2$ | $\{a, b\}, 0.02$ | $\{a, b\}, 0.08$ | $\{a, b, c\}, 0.1$ |
|  | $\{a, c\}, 0.03$ | $\{a, b, c\}, 0.12$ | $\{a, c\}, 0.15$ |  |

The resulting mass function is

$$
\begin{aligned}
\left(m_{1} \cup m_{2}\right)(\{a, b\}) & =0.05+0.2+0.02+0.08=0.35 \\
\left(m_{1} \cup m_{2}\right)(\{b, c\}) & =0.25 \\
\left(m_{1} \cup m_{2}\right)(\{a, c\}) & =0.03+0.15=0.18 \\
\quad\left(m_{1} \cup m_{2}\right)(\Omega) & =0.1+0.12=0.22
\end{aligned}
$$

## Disjunctive rule

Properties

- Commutativity, associativity.
- No neutral element.
- $m_{\text {? }}$ is an absorbing element.
- Expression using belief functions:

$$
B e l_{1} \cup B e l_{2}=B e l_{1} \cdot B e l_{2}
$$

## Definition

- In general, the disjunctive rule may be preferred in case of heavy conflict between the different pieces of evidence.
- An alternative rule, which is somehow intermediate between the disjunctive and conjunctive rules, has been proposed by Dubois and Prade (1988). It is defined as follows:

$$
\left(m_{1} \uplus m_{2}\right)(A)=\sum_{B \cap C=A} m_{1}(B) m_{2}(C)+\sum_{\{B \cap C=\emptyset, B \cup C=A\}} m_{1}(B) m_{2}(C),
$$

for all $A \subseteq \Omega, A \neq \emptyset$, and $\left(m_{1} \uplus m_{2}\right)(\emptyset)=0$.

## Example

| $A$ | $\emptyset$ | $\{a\}$ | $\{b\}$ | $\{a, b\}$ | $\{c\}$ | $\{a, c\}$ | $\{b, c\}$ | $\{a, b, c\}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $m_{1}(A)$ | 0 | 0 | 0.5 | 0.2 | 0 | 0.3 | 0 | 0 |
| $m_{2}(A)$ | 0 | 0.1 | 0 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0 | 0 | 0 |


|  |  | $m_{2}$ |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | $\{a\}, 0.1$ | $\{a, b\}, 0.4$ | $\{c\}, 0.5$ |
| $m_{1}$ | $\{b\}, 0.5$ | $\{a, b\}, 0.05$ | $\{b\}, 0.2$ | $\{b, c\}, 0.25$ |
|  | $\{a, c\}, 0.3$ | $\{a\}, 0.02$ | $\{a, b\}, 0.08$ | $\{a, b, c\}, 0.1$ |
|  | $\{a\}, 0.03$ | $\{a\}, 0.12$ | $\{c\}, 0.15$ |  |

$$
\begin{aligned}
\left(m_{1} \uplus m_{2}\right)(\{a, b\}) & =0.05+0.08=0.13 \\
\left(m_{1} \uplus m_{2}\right)(\{b\}) & =0.2 \\
\left(m_{1} \uplus m_{2}\right)(\{b, c\}) & =0.25 \\
\left(m_{1} \uplus m_{2}\right)(\{a\}) & =0.02+0.03+0.12=0.17 \\
\left(m_{1} \uplus m_{2}\right)(\{c\}) & =0.15 \\
\left(m_{1} \uplus m_{2}\right)(\Omega) & =0.1 .
\end{aligned}
$$

## Properties

- The DP rule boils down to the conjunctive and disjunctive rules when, respectively, the degree of conflict is equal to zero and one.
- In other cases, it has some intermediate behavior.
- It is not associative. If several pieces of evidence are available, they should be combined at once using an obvious $n$-ary extension of the above formula.


## Outline

(1) Representation of evidence

- Mass functions
- Belief and plausibility functions

2 Relations with alternative theories

- Possibility theory
- Imprecise probabilities
(3) Combination of evidence
- Dempster's rule
- Some other rules
- Marginalization, extension


## Multidimensional belief functions

- Let $X$ and $Y$ be two variables defined on frames $\Omega_{X}$ and $\Omega_{Y}$
- Let $\Omega_{X Y}=\Omega_{X} \times \Omega_{Y}$ be the product frame
- A mass function $m_{X Y}$ on $\Omega_{X Y}$ can be seen as an generalized relation between variables $X$ and $Y$
- Two basic operations on product frames
(1) Express a joint mass function $m_{X Y}$ in the coarser frame $\Omega_{X}$ or $\Omega_{Y}$ (marginalization)
(2) Express a marginal mass function $m_{X}$ on $\Omega_{X}$ in the finer frame $\Omega_{X Y}$ (vacuous extension)


## Marginalization



- Problem: express $m_{X Y}$ in $\Omega_{X}$
- Solution: transfer each mass $m_{X Y}(A)$ to the projection of $A$ on $\Omega_{X}$
- Marginal mass function

$$
m_{X Y \downarrow X}(B)=\sum_{\left\{A \subseteq \Omega_{X Y}, A \downarrow \Omega_{X}=B\right\}} m_{X Y}(A) \quad \forall B \subseteq \Omega_{X}
$$

- Generalizes both set projection and probabilistic marginalization


## Vacuous extension



- Problem: express $m_{X}$ in $\Omega_{X Y}$
- Solution: transfer each mass $m_{X}(B)$ to the cylindrical extension of $B$ : $B \times \Omega_{Y}$
- Vacuous extension:

$$
m_{X \uparrow X Y}(A)= \begin{cases}m_{X}(B) & \text { if } A=B \times \Omega_{Y} \\ 0 & \text { otherwise }\end{cases}
$$

## Application to approximate reasoning

- Assume that we have:
- Partial knowledge of $X$ formalized as a mass function $m_{X}$
- A joint mass function $m_{X Y}$ representing an uncertain relation between $X$ and $Y$
- What can we say about $Y$ ?
- Solution:

$$
m_{Y}=\left(m_{X \uparrow X Y} \oplus m_{X Y}\right)_{\downarrow Y}
$$

- Simpler notation:

$$
m_{Y}=\left(m_{X} \oplus m_{X Y}\right)_{\downarrow Y}
$$

- Infeasible with many variables and large frames of discernment, but efficient algorithms exist to carry out the operations in frames of minimal dimensions

